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ARTICLES
HARASSMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL TORT:

THE OTHER JURISPRUDENCE
Mark M. Hager*

I. INTRODUCTION

Sexual harassment law is booming. Charges have skyrocketed in
recent years' for three main reasons. First, workplace harassment and
mistreatment are distressingly frequent. Second, Title VII doctrine
makes it easy to state a claim of harassment. Third, amendments passed
in 1991 authorize compensatory and punitive damages against
employers for Title VII violations, thereby augmenting plaintiff and
lawyer incentives to sue In coming years, harassment litigation will
occupy more and more attention from courts and employers.
This proliferation has spawned a small but growing amount of
literature debating the nature and wisdom of Title VII harassment
doctrine. Reservations have been raised around a number of themes,
among them: whether and when it makes sense to view harassment as
employment discrimination;4 whether compliance with harassment law
chills expression and other valued freedoms at work;5 whether employer
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington, D.C.
1. Claims before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") jumped
from 6883 in 1991 to 15,889 in 1997. See EEOC Sexual Harassment Statistics FY 1991 - FY 1997
(visited Jan. 22, 1999) <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.htnil> (on file with the Hofstra Labor &
Employment Law Journal).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
3. See Morrison v. Carelton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 437 (1st Cir. 1997).
4. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassmentas a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment
Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 375, 377 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What's
Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 692-98 (1997).
5. See Hager, supra note 4, at 411; Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship: HostileEnvironment Harassment
and the First
Amendment,
52 OHio ST. L.J.
481,TT'T
483A (1991);
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in-house investigation and discipline violate fairness and due process
values. A period of close and critical debate on these and other
problems has begun to supersede an earlier period when zeal to suppress
harassment fueled expansion of Title VII law as the chief weapon
against it.
For the past two decades, harassment law's most important
developments have been under Title VII's prohibition against
employment discrimination based on sex.7 The volume of cases has
been large and the commentary on them prolific. This dominance has
inscribed Title VII's model of sexual harassment as discrimination.
Title VII models sexual harassment as discrimination in two senses: as
sex discrimination and as employment discrimination.' Both are crucial
to the actionability of sexual harassment under Title VII.
Unnoticed by many, a secondary body of federal anti-harassment
law has emerged besides Title VII, within the framework of
"constitutional tort" jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v.
FederalBureau of Narcotics.9 My most minimal purpose in this Article
is to call attention to this body of law. But I have other purposes as well.
First, I highlight contrasts between constitutional tort and Title VII
jurisprudence on harassment. Second, I use those contrasts to
underscore weaknesses, tensions, and ambiguities in Title VII's
discrimination model of harassment. Third, I urge particular doctrinal
structures and standpoints for harassment law generally.
I examine the harassment law of constitutional tort first, to explore
its contours and tensions, and second, to cast comparative and critical
light on Title VII doctrine. This facilitates a more probing inquiry into
the nature of harassment's wrongfulness than is sometimes found. I
highlight ambiguity, ambivalence and dissensus on morality and policy
in harassment law not so readily apparent within the widely-studied
world of Title VII alone. This may help suggest worthwhile
modifications in Title VII doctrine and policy. Furthermore, I scrutinize
how constitutional tort law can be used to defend workplace speech
freedoms and victims of unfair harassment accusations and discipline.
Here again, I suggest ramifications for Title VII doctrine.
Plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment at work typically seek relief
1793-95
6.
7.
8.

(1992).
See Hager, supranote 4, at 390.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
See id.

9. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (stating that the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides private right of action for damages against federal officials).
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under Title VII. Harassment has been treated by courts as a species of
forbidden discrimination on the basis of "sex."'" Title VII provides
remedies to both private and public employees." Under Title VII,
actionable harassment is defined broadly. A "hostile environment," the
easiest claim to state, essentially requires only conduct of a sexual

nature that causes a hostile work environment.'3 Neither a culpable mind
on the harasser's part, nor a tortious injury on the plaintiffs part is
required for actionability. 4 Moreover, attribution of vicarious liability is
broad. Employers answer for harassment perpetrated by their employees
based on standards ranging from very strict attribution to moderately
strict attribution based on constructive knowledge."
Given Title VII's favorable contours, plaintiffs often feel little
need to search elsewhere for relief. There are, however, some
anti-plaintiff dimensions to Title VII that may be avoidable by recourse
to alternative claims. For example, Title VII has a short statute of
limitations; 6 requires administrative process with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") before claims may be
filed; 7 allows suit only against employers, not individual perpetrators;"
and may bar some same-sex harassment suits. 9 Alternative claims may
overcome such problems. They may arise under common law tort, state
anti-discrimination statutes, and state constitutional protections.
For public employees specifically, there may be claims for federal
constitutional violations under § 1983 (for state employees) or under

10. See Morrison v. Carelton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429,438 (1st Cir. 1997).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
12. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
13. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (stating that in a Title VII hostile
environment claim, plaintiff need not prove psychic injury); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
14. See Harris,510 U.S. at 21; Morrison, 108 F.3d at 439.
15. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997), aff'd sub. nom. Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 876 (1998).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994) (stating that allegations of unlawful employment
practices are to be filed within 180 days of the occurrence).
17. See id. § 2000e-5(c) (stating that victims of unlawful employment practices may not sue
individually until 60 days after proceedings commenced by EEOC).
18. See id. § 2000e(b) (defining employer as a "person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day" and "any agent of such a
person"); see also Redman v. Lima City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 889 F. Supp. 288,292 (N.D. Ohio
1995) (stating that Congress did not intend individual liability under Title VII, but that intent was
to impose employer liability).
19. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002 (1998) (stating that
some same-sex harassment suits are actionable under Title VII but other same-sex suits may be
barred).
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Bivens (for federal employees), 2° which protect against violations of
constitutional rights by persons acting under "color of law."'" Actions
for constitutional tort arise against persons who invade constitutional
rights while acting under color of law.2 Roughly, color of law means
the use of government-conferred authority.2 When the government
authority used to invade rights is state law, actionability arises under §
1983;4 when it is federal law, actionability arises according to Bivens.?
When the rights invaded arise from the Constitution, § 1983 and Bivens
suits implicate the jurisprudence of "constitutional tort."'6 Currently,
harassment in public workplaces may be actionable not only as
employment discrimination under Title VII, but also as constitutional
tort.
When perpetrated under color of law, harassment arguably entails
deprivation of equal protection. Like Title VII, this approach models
harassment as discrimination. Over the years, a number of suits have
asserted as much. 7 Below I report on the doctrinal structures and
controversies emerging from these suits and use them to raise questions
about Title VII doctrine and policy.
There is a more profound and coherent model for harassment as a
constitutional violation. Harassment under color of law may entail an
invasion of constitutionally protected autonomy, dignity and privacy,
thereby violating substantive due process under the Fourteenth (state
employees) and Fifth (federal employees) Amendments. Though
autonomy, dignity and privacy may be the precise rights most clearly
invaded when harassment occurs under color of law, I have seen no case
raising this claim. Below I sketch out the jurisprudence of such claims.
Depending on the interplay of circumstance and doctrine,
constitutional tort suits may lie against harassers for active perpetration
of harassment, and against supervisors, officials, and municipal
governments for failures to prevent harassment. So far, the
constitutional claim has been for violation of equal protection under the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Therefore, harassment has been
modeled as "sex discrimination" by analogy with Title VII's
20. See Bivens v. Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
21. See id.
22. See Carlos v. Santos, 123 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1997); Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d
38, 43 (2d Cir. 1996).
23. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); Carlos,123 F.3d at 65.
25. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
27. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388.
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employment model. However, constitutional tort is not fundamentally a
jurisprudence of employment discrimination. It is a jurisprudence of
state-inflicted constitutional harm in which workplace settings are
incidental. It is therefore no surprise that liability doctrines in
constitutional tort differ from those evolved under Title VII. Moreover,
harassment law structured by § 1983 doctrines may be wiser than what
has emerged under Title VII.
The constitutional tort jurisprudence of sexual harassment differs
intriguingly from Title VII harassment law due to the different doctrines
they were derived from. First, constitutional tort (referred to hereinafter
by the term "§ 1983") suits lie against "persons" acting under "color of
law,"" while Title VII suits lie against "employers." 29 Second, vicarious
liability, cognizable but puzzling under Title VII, is sharply narrower
under § 1983 due to an outright ban on respondeat superior. Third,
because it is not limited to "discrimination" based on "sex," § 1983 may
allow broader actionability-for same-sex harassment, for examplethan does Title VII.L Fourth, Title VII recognizes prima facie liability
based on discriminatory impact alone,3 2 while § 1983 may require
higher culpability, even as high as discriminatory intent.33 Fifth, Title
VII actionability requires no tortious injury to state a claim," but § 1983
might. 5 Each of these points will be examined below.
There is one crucial respect, however, in which constitutional tort
jurisprudence mimics the Title VII jurisprudence: treating harassment
under a sex discrimination model. One of my themes here will be to
explore replacing the sex discrimination model with what I call a
"personhood" model. The anti-harassment project under Title VII has
been to model harassment as discrimination. Though plausible for some
situations, that model is hardly the most compelling one, and it is
certainly not the only one. More tangible and accessible is a model of
harassment as intentional tort-the non-consensual invasion of personal
autonomy, dignity, and privacy. I call this model of harassment a
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
29. See National Collegiate Athletic Assoc. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).
30. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1000 (1998).
31. See42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
32. See id. § 2000e-2(19).
33. See Gonzalez v. Lee County Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1300 n.35 (11th Cir. 1998).
But see Burrell v. Board of Trustees, 970 F.2d 785, 793-794 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
34. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
35. See Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1982); Friedman v. Village
of Skokie, 763 F.2d 236,239 (7th Cir. 1985).
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"personhood" model, to contrast it with the discrimination model of
harassment that prevails under Title VII. The personhood model
conceptualizes harassment basically as an assault on "personhood":
individual rights of autonomy, privacy, and dignity.
One of my themes is to highlight the advantages of a personhood
model over a discrimination model for sexual harassment. Important
implications may flow from this difference. With the personhood
model, the wrongfulness and harm of harassment appear as essentially
tortious. Compared with Title VII's discrimination model, a tort
approach implies reduced harassment liability for employers but
expanded liability for individual harassers. 6 Sanctions would be
pursued by victims with direct lawsuits against perpetrators rather than
with discrimination suits attempting to manipulate employers into
controlling harassment. The pros and cons of such an approach deserve
careful scrutiny.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows:
Part II explores in various ways and from various perspectives the
theme of harassment as an assault on "personhood," implicating
substantive due process under the Constitution.
Subpart I.A analyzes the Paula Jones complaint against President
Clinton. It highlights problems with Jones's theories of actionability
under current harassment law and also with claims she raises under the
First Amendment and under substantive due process. It explains how
she might have framed a more coherent substantive due process claim.
Subpart II.B explains further the paradigm of harassment as a
wrong of assaulted personhood, commenting on how such a paradigm
may improve upon the paradigm of harassment as sex discrimination.
This subpart also explores the doctrinal grounding for treating
harassment as a substantive due process personhood offense and
comments on appropriate limits on actionability.
Subpart II.C comments on implications of the assaulted
personhood paradigm for Title VII harassment law and tort.
Subpart II.D develops the comparison between the discrimination
paradigm for harassment and the assaulted personhood paradigm by
exploring the concepts of "discrimination" and "discriminatory intent."
Subpart II.E compares the two paradigms further by exploring the
law of damages under § 1983 and Title VII.
Subpart II.F develops that comparison still further by exploring
36. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassmentas a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment
LiabilityShould Be Curtailed,30 CONN. L. REv. 375, 377 (1998).
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theories of recovery for same-sex harassment under Title VII and §
1983.
Part II explores the problem of which parties should be legally
answerable for harassment and on what basis. It does this by exploring
existing § 1983 harassment doctrine critically, and also by comparing it
with Title VII doctrine. It suggests that harassment liability should
largely be based on breach of duty to prevent harassment, measured
under a standard of "deliberate indifference," familiar to § 1983
jurisprudence.
Subpart III.A compares Title VII doctrine on attribution of
harassment to employers with "color of law" jurisprudence in § 1983
harassment cases. This comparison highlights clashing notions in
current law on how to view legal relations between actual harassers and
other parties-both persons and organizations-arguably implicated in
the harassment. In this context, the subpart raises the theme of
"deliberate indifference" as a general standard of liability for failure to
prevent harassment by other parties.
Subpart II.B argues substantively for a deliberate indifference
standard of duty to prevent harassment by other parties. It defends that
standard as more restrictive on liability than the broader negligence and
strict liability standards applied under current Title VII doctrine. It
explores the disadvantages of expansive duty in order to highlight the
advantages of a narrower duty, which could be applied under both §
1983 and Title VII.
Subparts 11.C through II.H explore the law of municipal liability
for harassment under § 1983. They try to suggest what a sound and
coherent doctrinal approach to municipal liability would look like.
Subpart II.C explains the basic doctrinal landscape of municipal
liability under § 1983, contrasting it with employer harassment liability
under Title VII.
Subpart Iff.D offers simple criteria for municipal harassment
liability under a standard of deliberate indifference.
Subpart I11.E comments on the proper doctrinal treatment of
municipal anti-harassment policies in assessing liability.
Subpart III.F comments on the proper role of municipal "failure to
train" jurisprudence for harassment liability.
Subpart III.G comments on the proper role of "final policymaking
authority" jurisprudence for municipal harassment liability.
Subpart III.H comments on an odd relation between quid pro quo
and hostile environment municipal liability.
Part IV explores the contrapuntal theme of treating anti-harassment
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policies as infringements of constitutional rights. Though law may
require that steps be taken against harassment, law may also limit those
steps so as to preclude abridgement of protected interests other than that
of freedom from harassment. This Part comments on how such limits
may get articulated under § 1983 law. Subpart IV.A deals withusing the
First Amendment to guard against overregulation of speech under
workplace anti-harassment policies. Subpart IV.B deals with, using
procedural due process law to guard against unfair dismissals of alleged
harassers.
Part V concludes.
II. HARASSMENT AND ASSAULTED PERSONHOOD

A. The PaulaJones Complaint
The Paula Jones case against President Clinton brought § 1983
harassment law out of obscurity, placing it into some limelight. It is
worth exploring in some detail the key features of § 1983 law,
harassment law under Title VII, and the relationship between the two.
The Paula Jones suit seeks compensatory and punitive damages
against Clinton and former Arkansas trooper Danny Ferguson for
alleged harassment of Jones when Clinton was the Arkansas governor.
Jones was a low-ranking employee in the Arkansas Industrial
Development Commission ("AIDC"), a division within the executive
branch of the State of Arkansas headed by Clinton." In ,her First
Amended Complaint, Jones pleads several claims. The pertinent claims
are that the defendants, acting under "color of law," deprived Jones of
constitutional equal protection, due process, and First Amendment
rights, and that they intentionally inflicted emotional distress."
The complaint alleges that Clinton, using Ferguson as his
intermediary, invited Jones to visit his hotel suite during an executive
branch management conference. Jones had never met Clinton, but
complied with the request, thinking that the visit "might lead to an
enhanced employment opportunity with the State."4 ° She soon found
37. See Plaintiff's Complaint 6, Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (No.
LR-C-94-290) [hereinafter Jones Complaint] (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law
Journal).
38. See id. 60-65, 71-74.
39. See id.U 7, 10.
40. Id. 12.
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herself alone in Clinton's suite. 1 During brief small talk, Clinton
referred to Dave Harrington, AIDC director and Jones's ultimate
superior, as his "good friend."'2 Clinton had appointed Harrington to his
post.4
Clinton then pulled Jones close to him, whereupon Jones retreated
and Clinton approached again, saying "I love the way your hair flows
down your back," and "I love your curves."' Then, without Jones's
consent, he reached toward her crotch with his hand and attempted to
kiss her neck. 5 Jones cried, "What are you doing?" and retreated again,
attempting to distract Clinton with talk about his wife. 46 She took a seat
at the end of a sofa nearest the door.47 Clinton asked whether she was
married.48 She told him she had a regular boyfriend. 9
Clinton then sat down and lowered his pants, exposing his erect
penis. He asked Jones to "kiss it."' 5' Horrified, Jones refused, jumped
up, and said, "Look I've got to go," telling Clinton she might get in
trouble for being away from her post. 2 Fondling his penis, Clinton said,53
"Well, I don't want to make you do anything you don't want to do.
He rose, pulled his pants up, and said, "If you get in trouble for leaving
work, have Dave call me immediately and I'll take care of it.' ' 54 As
Jones departed, he looked at her sternly, saying "You are smart. Let's
keep this between ourselves. 55
Such are Jones's allegations concerning her visit to Clinton's suite.
If true, they recount a terribly distressing unwelcome sexual advance.
Other key allegations frame the incident into possible sexual harassment
claims under both quid pro quo and hostile environment rubrics.56 Jones
alleges that other women working for the State of Arkansas gained
promotions, perquisites and pay hikes by complying with Clinton's

41. See id. 16.
42. Jones Complaint, supranote 37,
43. See id.
44. Id. 20.

17.

45. See id.
46.
47.

See id. 21.
See Jones Complaint,supra note 37, 21.

48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See Jones Complaint, supra note 37, 23.

53. Id.
54. Id. 124.

55. Id.
56. See id. M 61-62.
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requests for sexual favors, but that she herself, upon refusing Clinton,
was denied merit increases awarded to employees and transferred
pretextually to a dead-end position where she was denied the higher pay
supposedly warranted by its higher grade status. 7 She also alleges postincident surveillance and fear of job loss for having rebuffed Clinton
and for her potential to report his conduct."8
In pleading legal claims purportedly established, Jones contends
that the events she alleges constitute gender discrimination, thereby
depriving her of her constitutional right to equal protection." In this
respect, her complaint tracks familiar contours of harassment law under
Title VII. The pleadings thereby provide an opportunity to raise
questions about ambiguities in existing Title VII law. More intriguing,
however, is that Jones also pleads deprivation of due process liberty and
° It is difficult to say from the murky face of the
property rights.W
complaint what due process rights she contends she had, and of which
she was deprived. She claims her "property interest in her public
employee job" was jeopardized; that she was subjected to fear of losing
that job; that she was subjected to a sexual quid pro quo for keeping it;
and that she was subjected to "fear of losing the enjoyment of a proper
and pleasant work environment" which
"deprived [her] of the proper
' 6
enjoyment and efficiency of her work. '
Jones pleads further legal claims based on her allegations: first,
that she was deprived of her First Amendment rights to report Clinton's
misconduct because she was intimidated, 62 and second, that Clinton's
actions established63 the common law tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
I will comment here on several aspects of the complaint and use
that commentary to serve several purposes. I provide a basic orientation
to § 1983 issues to be developed more fully in later parts. I offer
arguments that Jones's sexual harassment claims as framed should have
been dismissed. I then offer a reformulation of the complaint's notion
that due process rights were violated if Clinton harassed Jones as
alleged.
Relief under § 1983 lies against any "person" using state law
57. See Jones Complaint, supranote 37,

39.

58. See id. 36-37.
59. See id. 60.
60. See id. 62-63.
61. Id. [62.
62. See Jones Complaint, supranote 37,
63. See id. N 71-74.

64.
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authority to infringe constitutional rights. 6' For purposes of basic
orientation, we can distinguish four classes of theoretically possible
defendants: states; municipalities or other political subdivisions of
states; state or municipal officials and employees; and private parties.
States may not be sued in some jurisdictions under § 1983.6 Therefore,
Paula Jones could not state a § 1983 claim naming Arkansas as a
defendant. Though Jones could theoretically have named Arkansas,
Clinton's employer, as a Title VII defendant, the statute of limitations
for Title VII had lapsed by the time she filed her first complaint some
three years after her first encounter with Clinton.6 Municipalities can be
sued under § 1983 for customs, policies, or practices causing
constitutional infringements.6' Officials and employees can be sued for
infringements, unless they are entitled to qualified immunity on grounds
that the right allegedly infringed was not clearly established or that the
infringement was not an unreasonable one.6 Private parties can be sued
under § 1983 if classified as "state actors" for the matter in question. 9
The cases show that harassment in the form of sexual
discrimination means the same under § 1983 as it means under Title
VII.7 In other words, Supreme Court rulings and EEOC regulations
defining what acts constitute "sexual harassment" are also authoritative
under § 1983. Therefore, issues to be raised here regarding Jones's
claims are issues equally presented under Title VII.
Those issues are several fold. Do Jones's allegations state a gender
discrimination claim and if so, how?
Harassment as gender discrimination has been conceptualized in

64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
65. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989).
66. See Peter Baker & Lois Romano, PresidentAsks Court to Toss Out Paula Jones Case;
No Distress or CareerHarmIs Evident,Motion Argues, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1998, at A01.
67. See Jarman v. City of Northlake, 950 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating that
municipalities can be sued directly under § 1983 (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978))); see also Farris v. Board of County Comm'rs, 924 F. Supp. 1041, 1048 (D. Kan.
1996) (discussing that a county is liable under § 1983 for sexual harassment only if the actions of
an agent or employee of the county can be "characterized as representing an official policy or
custom" of the county).
68. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987) (qualifying immunity
warranted for public officials/employees, unless the right allegedly infringed was "clearly
established" and abridgement was unreasonable); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
69. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 156 (1978).
70. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S.
Ct. 2275 (1998); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185-86 (7th Cir. 1986); Farrell v.
State of New York, 946 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
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terms of two types: so-called quid pro quo and hostile environment.7 '
Quid pro quo, the narrower category, is subjection to demands for
sexual favors under threat of job loss or other penalty for refusing.72
Hostile environment, a broader category, refers to unwelcome sexual
advances causing a hostile work environment. It is not obvious why
these two types should be distinguished from each other. Any quid pro
quo harassment arguably involves an unwelcome sexual advance
creating a hostile environment. This makes quid pro quo a particular
subset of hostile environment. There is no need for precise delineation
between quid pro quo and hostile environment, unless the distinction
makes a legal difference. Some courts take the position that such a legal
difference lies in standards of employer liability under Title VII: strict
liability for quid pro quo and negligence liability for hostile
environment.74 Not all jurisdictions accept this difference and its
soundness is open to question.75 The Jones complaint helps illustrate
how blurry the distinction on which it is based can become.
If there is a quid pro quo claim in the complaint, it is that women
who gave Clinton sex were accorded favorable treatment while Jones,
who refused, was not. If allegations to this effect are true, it suggests
that Jones was denied favorable job treatment for refusing. But several
difficulties beset any such claim. One is that proving it will typically
require establishing the sexual affairs of people who strongly and
justifiably wish to keep those affairs secret. At minimum, courts should
grant protective orders against being forced to testify concerning
consensual intimacies. This of course will make such claims tough to
prove, yielding routine grants of summary judgment against plaintiffs.
But plaintiffs will also seek to prove their claims through third-party
testimony about the sexual relationships of others. The resulting psychic
carnage may be intense in the form of false accusations, defamed
reputations, destroyed marriages and friendships, vendettas, intrigues,
perjury, and more. This disturbing spectacle arguably warrants
protective orders. But protective orders may not suffice to protect
privacy adequately. Even being summoned and forced to seek protective

71. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (distinguishing quid pro quo
and hostile environment harassment).
72. See Redman v. Lima City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 889 F. Supp. 288, 292 (N.D. Ohio

1995).
73. See id. at 293.
74. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490, 493-95 (7th Cir. 1997), affd sub. noin.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998).
75. See id. at 494.
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orders may place many people in awkward, embarrassing and
humiliating positions, i.e., "Do I tell my wife about this subpoena?" The
harms that may ensue are huge and incalculable.
The whole nature of claims turning on the sexual affairs of others
is so indelicate, intrusive, and explosive as to suggest that such claims
should be dismissed outright. Even if it makes sense to say that a
workplace where sexual dalliance promotes advancement is
discriminatory based on sex, the harms of litigating such claims may
greatly outweigh the harm done by such discrimination.
Moreover, there are major ambiguities in conceptualizing such
claims as discrimination based on sex. First, if those favored for their
sexual willingness are women, one must at least hesitate before calling
this discrimination against women. Indeed, the situation may confer
advantages on certain women over their male counterparts. Second,
what of those women (and men) who do not find favor because they are
not sought out for sex in the first place? Falling behind for being left
uninvited seems every bit as unfair as being left behind for refusing. But
those never asked have no quid pro quo claim and they have a hostile
environment claim only under a theory that a workplace where sexual
availability promotes advancement is inherently hostile. Jones in fact
describes her inferior treatment compared with Clinton's alleged sexual
partners as a "hostile work environment." 76 The enormous potential
breadth of such actionability and the psychic carnage that proof of
affairs may bring should be considered very soberly. The implications
of allowing such claims were dramatically underscored in Jones v.
Clinton'7 when Monica Lewinsky was subpoenaed. The foreseeable
damage from such claims is immense, even when no presidents are
involved.
Without doubt, there is galling unfairness in a workplace where sex
promotes advancement. But anti-discrimination law does not, should
not, and cannot outlaw all forms of nonmeritocratic preference. Whether
sexual availability preference is more unfair than other nonmeritocratic
preferences is open to question. It is also open to question whether it is
widespread and serious enough to justify legal claims with so many
inherent harms entailed in the proof.
Further problems loom into view when one ponders what

76. See Plaintiff's Complaint 161, Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (No.
LR-C-94-290) [hereinafter Jones Complaint] (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law
Journal).
77. 974 F. Supp. 712,724 (E.D. Ark. 1997) [hereinafter Jones I1].
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employers might do to avoid liability for such claims. Hostile
environment law already puts employers under strong pressure to
monitor and regulate workforces against harassment or situations that
could lead to it."5 The burden on employers and onerous effects on
employees and workforces are plenty worrisome. These difficulties
accelerate greatly if employers know they may face lawsuits based even
on fully consensual affairs, filed by nonparticipants.
The remainder of Jones's sex discrimination claim alleges fear of
job loss, fear of adverse employment actions, and subjection to
surveillance for having rebuffed Clinton." Such a claim is child's play
to plead by anyone who rebuffs a boss's proposition. Any unwelcome
sexual advance by a boss might be characterized as causing a hostile
environment of fear. 0 Theoretically, a hostile environment claim based
on a boss's unwelcome sexual advances can be conceptualized as
consisting of three indispensable elements: (1) the advances, (2)
causing, and (3) a hostile work environment. But Jones's pleading
suggests that (2) and (3) can easily be conjured out of (1). Perhaps
sensing the arguable overbreadth of this, Jones's lawyers allege an
implied threat conveyed by Clinton's remarks, intonations, body
language, and innuendo, as well as subsequent actions by Ferguson and
Clinton." A claim pleading no threats as objective basis for fear should
probably be subject to dismissal, for reasons suggested just above. But
implied threats may be so easy to claim that the threat requirement
means little. Concern about overbroad actionability may be what
prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari last term on whether an
unimplemented threat of adverse job consequences for refusing a sexual
advance can constitute actionable harassment." If unimplemented
threats are actionable, unwelcome sexual advances by bosses become
almost inherently actionable.
Jones's claim for First Amendment infringement is probably
dismissible. Though Clinton allegedly intimidated Jones from reporting
78. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, HarassmentAs a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment
Liability Should Be Curtailed,30 CONN. L. REv. 375, 407-11 (1998); Nicks v. State of Missouri,
67 F.3d 699, 702-04 (8th Cir. 1995); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986);
Farris v. Board of County Comm'rs, 924 F. Supp. 1041, 1049 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating that liability
may be imposed under § 1983 if officials know of sexual harassment and fail to stop it); Houck v.
City of Prairie Village, 912 F. Supp. 1438, 1442 (D. Kan. 1996).
79. See Jones v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902, 904 (E.D. Ark. 1994) [hereinafter Jones 1].
80. See Jones1H, 974 F. Supp. at 724.
81. See id,
82. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265-71 (1998) (ruling that
unimplemented threats may be actionable).
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his misconduct, this would not infringe established public employee
free speech rights. Those rights protect her freedom to express herself
on matters of "public concern," but not on matters of "personal
interest."83 It is not easy to see how Jones's personal distress or job
anxiety could be framed as matters of public concern. Perhaps public
concern lies in the sexual misconduct of a state governor. A more
straightforward approach would confine "public concern" to
commentary on a governor's execution of his official duties. •
Jones's complaint tracks Title VII law in treating harassment as
sexual discrimination. Interestingly, however, it also sets forth
conceptions other than sex discrimination for the illegality of Clinton's
alleged actions. For one, it claims those actions establish the common
law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.' For another, it
claims that they deprived Jones of due process liberty and property
rights. 5 The complaint must be read carefully to bring these due process
claims into view. When brought into view, several are anything but
clear. The clearest pleads a version of forced imprisonment by Clinton
and Ferguson, presumably violating a liberty interest in personal
mobility.86 Another pleads deprivation of her job enjoyment and work
efficiency, impliedly asserting that she has due process liberty or
property rights to them." Jones also pleads violation of an asserted
property interest in her public sector job and asserts liberty interests to
be free from fear of job loss, fear of coercion into sex with Clinton, and
perhaps fear of losing job enjoyment and pleasurable work
atmosphere."
There is some wheat and much chaff in these tangled due process
claims and it is worthwhile trying to sort them. At one end of things,
there is no doubt that forcible detention could infringe a cognizable
liberty right. Whether Jones's factual allegations support her claim of
forcible detention is more dubious. At the other end, there is little doubt
that Jones had no cognizable liberty or property rights to job enjoyment
or work efficiency. If she has no constitutional rights to such things, it
would seem she also has no constitutional rights not to be placed in fear
of losing them. Though of dubious status as constitutional
83. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 139 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of
Township High Sch. Dist. 205,391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
84. See Jones Complaint, supranote 76, U 71-74.
85. See id. U[ 62-63.
86. See id. 164.
87. See id. 62.

88. See id.U 61-62.
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infringements, such fears may conceivably be part of the intentionally
inflicted emotional distress she pleads as a common law claim.
Problems also beset Jones's claim that constitutional infringements
inhere in her fear of job loss for rebuffing Clinton and her fear of being
forced into sex with Clinton in order to keep her job.89 Though Jones
claims she had a "property interest in her public employee job," she
probably had none because Arkansas had conferred her no right to
tenure in her job. Of course, she does not claim that she lost her job
because of Clinton. Even if she had, she would state no claim for
deprivation of property. Instead, her discharge would give her a claim
for quid pro quo harassment. Job loss would figure as an element of that
claim and as an item of damages perhaps, but would infringe no
property right.
Jones pleads no deprivation of her asserted property right in her
job, but she ambiguously pleads fear of job loss as a constitutional
deprivation. 9 She also pleads fear of being forced into sex with Clinton
in order to avoid losing it.9' If Jones has no right to her job, it is unclear
how she can state a claim for fear of losing it. There is no right as such
not to be placed in fear of job loss.? In the absence of any such right,
Jones's claim comes under a heavy cloud. Comparable fogginess
surrounds Jones's claim over fear of being forced into sex in order to
keep her job. Jones has a right to not be raped, but has no right not to be
asked. She asserts a right not to be placed in fear of being asked upon
pains of losing her job. Since she has no right not to be asked, no right
to her job, and no right not to be placed in fear of losing it, it is hard to
see how she had a right not to be placed in fear of being asked upon
pains of losing it.
Of course, if Jones actually lost her job for rebuffing Clinton, she
would state a quid pro quo claim under current law.93 But her effort to
shoehorn herself into the due process clause based on her various fears
yield claims that are highly tenuous.
Still, there is something profound in the instinct that Clinton's
actions, as alleged, implicate the due process clause. The complaint runs
aground trying to formulate a due process claim in terms of dubious
rights to job tenure, job enjoyment, work efficiency, and rights not to be
subject to various fears, where there are no underlying rights not to be
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Jones 1, 853 F. Supp. at 904.
See Jones 11, 974 F. Supp. at 725-26.
See Jones Complaint,supra note 76, 62.
See Jones II, 974 F. Supp. at 726.
See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 670-71 (E.D. Ark. 1998) [hereinafter Jones111].
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subject to the things feared.4 This approach, searching obsessively for
tenuous liberty and property interests, misses the forest for the trees.
The crucial wrongfulness of Clinton's actions, as alleged, lies in its
assault on Jones's dignity, privacy, autonomy, and emotional wellbeing. 95 If Jones's allegations are true and omit nothing significant,
Clinton perpetrated a deed in that hotel suite of astonishing callousness,
contempt, and disrespect for another human being. This is what lies at
the heart of Jones's common law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
As alleged, Clinton's deed is quite simply shocking to the
conscience. Conscience-shocking treatment of people by means of
government power violates due process rights. 96 Citizens have a
substantive liberty right against unconscionable treatment by
government.9 Attempting to grasp harassment law from that standpoint
is one of the major objectives of this Article.
If Clinton's action in the hotel suite was unconscionable, there may
be no need to scrutinize other facts and events, including Jones's
circumstances or subsequent experiences, in order to frame up a due
process claim. Jones's various fears come to bear a very different kind
of relevance, not as the basis for claims, but as items of damage within
her overall experience of emotional distress.
The complaint's ambiguous groping for a cognizable due process
claim reflects a surprising fact about harassment law under § 1983.
Harassment has not, in and of itself, been understood or recognized as a
due process offense. This is unfortunate and there is no good normative
reason for it. The explanation seems to lie in the history of harassment
law generally. First, under Title VII and then by imitation under § 1983,
harassment has been conceptualized as a matter of sex discrimination.9
This conceptualization has eclipsed competing conceptualizations,
especially that of grasping harassment as a matter of fundamental
assault on personhood, aside from all considerations of sex or gender.
As I shall insist below, the conceptualization of harassment as sex
discrimination is beset with ambiguities and disadvantages. The
eclipsed alternative conceptualization, assaulted personhood, is not just
94. See Jones Complaint, supra note 76, U 61-62.

95. See id.U 57, 64, 72-73.
96. See Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 528 (10th Cir. 1998).
97. See Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
98. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155 (1lth Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S.
Ct. 2275 (1998); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185-86 (7th Cir. 1986); Farrell v.
State of New York, 946 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
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available and coherent, but in several respects, superior. If such a
conceptualization were prevalent, a complaint like Jones's could be
framed more compellingly and less mischievously. Quid pro quo and
hostile environment allegations would become superfluous to stating a
claim. Among the happy consequences of this would be that opportunity

for redress of a basic wrong like Clinton's alleged deeds in the hotel
suite would not turn on proving the occurrence of private consensual

affairs.
There is no great strain to pleading a common law tort claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Jones's allegations."

Such a claim requires: (1) outrageous action; (2) committed
intentionally or recklessly; (3) causation of; and (4) severe emotional
distress."re There is no doubt that if the allegations are true and omit
nothing significant, Clinton's actions would amount at least to reckless
causation of some emotional distress.'' There could be some argument
whether his acts were "outrageous" and whether they caused "severe"
emotional distress." Were I the judge ruling on a motion to dismiss, I
would probably allow Clinton's alleged acts to be deemed "outrageous"
by a jury under a standard of shock to the conscience, the same standard
used to identify actionable assault upon personhood rights under §
1983.13 1 might hesitate to recognize "severe" emotional distress in the
pleadings, though the question may admittedly be treated as one of
fact.' 4 The complaint could be judged thin on pleading severe distress
99. See Jones 1, 858 F. Supp. at 904.
100. See Jones II, 974 F. Supp. at 729.
101. Seeid. at730.
102. See Jones111, 990 F. Supp. at 677.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128
(1992) (holding that the "shock conscience" standard requires a high level of outrageousness);
Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that in order to satisfy the "shock the
conscience" standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate "a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of
potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking").
104. See Declaration of Patrick J. Carnes, Ph.D., Plaintiff's Opposition To Defendant
Clinton's Motion For Summary Judgement, In The United States District Court For The Eastern
District Of Arkansas Western Division (No. LR-C-94-290) (visited Mar. 1, 1999)
<http:llinton.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/ ... ones.clinton.docs/patrick.carnes/00 I.jpg>
(stating that Jones suffers from "severe emotional distress," post-traumatic stress syndrome,
"severe and long-term" trauma, "extreme anxiety, intrusive thoughts and memories and
consequent sexual aversion") (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal).But
see President Clinton's Reply In Further Support Of His Motion For Summary Judgment at 8-11,
In The United States District Court For The Eastern District Of Arkansas Western Division (No.
LR-C-94-290) (stating that plaintiffs deposition testimony indicates absence of severe emotional
distress; expert opining that plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress lacked qualifications,
based opinion on "symptoms... described," not on independent psychological evaluation) (on file
with the HofstraLabor & Employment Law Journal).
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caused by the central incident itself. Of course, it could conceivably be
re-pled to remove this difficulty.
The common law emotional distress claim does not require that
Clinton acted under color of law when allegedly propositioning Jones.
This makes it easier to plead the common law tort claim than a § 1983
claim for unconscionable assault on personhood, or any other § 1983
claims, claims which do not arise unless the defendant acted "under
1 5 On the other hand, the common law tort requires "severe"
color.""
emotional distress to state a claim."' In this respect, it is harder to plead
than any claim under § 1983, including unconscionable assault on
personhood. I propose that presumed damages to personal dignity,
privacy and autonomy be recognized for conduct such as Clinton's in
the incident as alleged, even if Jones suffered no emotional distress
whatsoever.
Any § 1983 claim Jones might have is dismissible if Clinton's
alleged misdeeds fall outside "color of law."' 7 Against dismissal, it
could be urged that Clinton's high office and high rank over Jones bring
such misdeeds under color of law. This argument is weak, unless we
accept that any conceivable mistreatment of subordinate employees by a
governor takes place under color of law. Supporting dismissal is the fact
that any sexual overture was made for personal reasons, not in execution
of Clinton's state duties." On the other hand, Clinton allegedly utilized
a state employee, Ferguson, in effecting his overture." 9 This could be
ruled incidental rather than integral to any constitutional infringement,
since Clinton may not have contemplated his most outrageous alleged
act until Jones was in his presence. If I were judge, however, I would be
inclined to let a jury decide on "color of law" as an issue of fact,
instructing that this decision should turn on whether Ferguson's role
105. See JonesII, 974 F. Supp. at719.
106. See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS, § 46. Section 46 provides:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress,
and if bodily harm to the other results form it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether
or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily
harm.
Id.
107. See JonesII, 974 F. Supp. at 719.
108. See id.

109. See id.
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was incidental or integral.
B. Harassmentand Substantive Due Process
Harassment assaults personal dignity, autonomy, and privacy rights
protected under the due process clause." ° Though these are often called
"liberty" rights, I call them "personhood" rights because that label
seems broader and more evocative of autonomy, privacy, and especially
dignity values connected with fundamental respect for individual human
beings.
Jurisprudence under § 1983 has long recognized actionability for
personal mistreatment that "shocks the conscience. '
Such
mistreatment violates constitutional liberty rights protected under the
due process clause." 2 To date, this jurisprudence has not been applied to
harassment. Instead, § 1983 actions-modeled on Title VII-have
treated harassment as discrimination." 3 Yet, harassment lies near the
heart of what substantive due process forbids. If shocking physical
mistreatment violates due process, the same should be true of egregious
psychic or dignitarian mistreatment. That is what harassment sometimes
is.
There is a tight mutual resonance among the core ideas of
substantive due process, individual natural rights, and basic common
law tort. Deliberate infliction of harm upon a person is the very
paradigm of wrongfulness under all three conceptions. The rootedness
of substantive due process protections in common law tort principles is
widely understood, as is the rootedness of those common law principles
in notions of natural rights against personal invasion. Sexual
harassment, indeed any harassment, fits easily within these conceptions
of wrongfulness.
Of course, actionability should not lie for modest wrongs. Instead,
actionability for sexual harassment should track standards of culpability
and definitions of due process personhood offense already developed.
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. See Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 582 (6th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Click, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973); Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Inst., 879 F. Supp. 782, 792 (N.D.
Ohio 1995); Haag v. Cuyahoga County, 619 F. Supp. 262, 277-78 (N.D. Ohio 1985). But see
Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034 (6th Cir. 1995).
112. See Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-72 (1952).
113. See, e.g., Mentor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (discussing that sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VI); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago,
799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that sexual harassment constitutes sex
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection clause and is actionable under § 1983).
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Accordingly, actions for harassment should require showings of
shocking misbehavior and of deliberate indifference toward the
plaintiff's rights. 1 4 By these rights, the prevailing definition of sexual
harassment under Title VII seems unduly broad. Minimum pleading
allegations for Title VII hostile environment actionability require sexual
behavior causing a detriment to the target's work performance." 5 These
pleading elements seem broader than the type of egregious personal
assaults that violate substantive due process. It seems implausible to
conceptualize core personhood rights so broadly as to include protectibn
against sexual behavior that impedes work. Core personhood rights are
rights against deliberate personal affront. Actionability for harassment
should track this profound and established constitutional notion of
sacrosanct personhood.
Though this due process paradigm would in one respect constrict
actionability by narrowing the definition of harassment, it would in
another respect broaden actionability because it bypasses any
requirement to plead discrimination. Harassment under color of law
violates due process personhood rights regardless what group identity,
orientation, or attitude the target or perpetrator may have. Harassment
as assault on personhood sweeps beyond sexual harassment-beyond
racial, ethnic, or religious harassment as well-to encompass
unconscionable dignitarian assault of any kind. It includes as a subset
those forms of harassment which arguably constitute discrimination
(equal protection violations). However, it also renders the
discrimination/equal protection theory superfluous and redundant as
constitutional ground for actionability. As an assault on personhood,
sexual harassment is inherently no more grievous than harassment based
on personal animosity, cruelty, callousness, power intoxication, or
whimsy. Public employees, like citizens generally, have a constitutional
personhood right against unconscionable treatment by persons acting
under color of law.
Judge Posner has penned an interesting concurrence exploring the
114. Courts have been divided as to what level of defendant culpability must be pleaded to
state a claim for infringement of substantive due process rights. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331-32 (1986). Ordinary negligence is not enough. See id. Standards applied by courts have
included gross negligence, recklessness, deliberate indifference and shock to the conscience. See
Mitchell J. Edlund, Note, In the Heat of the Chase: Determining Substantive Due Process
Violations Within the Framework of Police Pursuits When an Innocent Bystander is Injured, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 161, 165-67 (1995).
115. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (stating that to show a
hostile environment, the court looks to whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance).
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theoretical basis of assessing municipal liability for failure to protect
against harassment.' 16 Exploring his opinion helps clarify the contours of
harassment jurisprudence under § 1983's discrimination model of equal
protection. It also helps clarify a due process personhood approach,
without ever mentioning it.
Posner explores what the proper basis might be for municipal
harassment liability under equal protection." 7 In keeping with the axiom
that states have no strict duty to protect citizens from third party harms,
he suggests that municipalities bear only a limited and contingent duty
to protect employees from harassment."' They do not bear an
affirmative duty to protect, but they do bear a duty not to deny
protection on a discriminatory basis. Analogizing, he writes: "Although
there is no constitutional right to police protection, there is a right not to
be denied such protection because one is black or a woman."'" 9 Posner
then explores how failure to protect against harassment may constitute
forbidden discrimination. How can failure to protect against harassment
count as "deliberate withdrawal of... protection from a female
employee because of her sex"?' Posner explains how harassment's
disparate impact on women, which is nonactionable under § 1983, can
be converted into discriminatory intent, which is actionable.'' This in
turn explains how an affirmative duty to protect specifically against
harassment can emerge within a context that denies affirmative duties in
general.
Posner reasons that a pattern of harassment's disparate impact
upon women, combined with municipal knowledge and inaction, yields
a presumption of illegal discriminatory intent." This presumption
places the municipality under a rebuttal burden of coming forward with
some legitimate reason for inaction.'2 Proof that preventing harassment
is inordinately costly could constitute such a legitimating reason, Posner
maintains. 24 In the case before him, Posner quickly finds liability
because the municipality offers no excuse whatsoever for inaction on

116. See Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180. 1189 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 1190.
120. Id
121. See Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1190.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1190-91.
124. See id. at 1191.
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harassment complaints.'2 That proves indifference to women's welfare
which, even if it is not outright hostility, meets the discriminatory intent
threshold for equal protection liability. It is exactly as if a municipality
ignored the fact that its firemen repeatedly refused to put out fires in
homes owned by blacks. 6
Posner indicates that a pattern of known harassment and inaction is
required to establish municipal liability in this manner. Such a pattern
requirement makes sense for inferring intent from impact because
discriminatory impact seems to require multiple incidents. However, a
pattern requirement is unsettling because it may leave seriously
harassed individuals remediless.
Posner serves up a striking point as he fleshes out his theories of
discrimination and limits on duty to prevent. He holds that a
municipality could decide for purely fiscal reasons not to protect
employees from any sort of misconduct by other employees." If there is
no requirement to prevent third-party harm, this would not violate rights
of harmed employees. Posner rules against the municipality before him
because he assumes that it tries to protect its employees from
interpersonal workplace injuries other than sexual harassment." The
city does not contend otherwise. If that same city makes no effort to
forestall sexual harassment, one can infer that it is selectively
indifferent to sexual harassment while responsive to other forms of
interpersonal workplace injury..
Posner argues that if selective indifference to sexual harassment is
unexcused, it is discriminatory.' 29 But selective indifference could be
excused if forestalling sexual harassment is disproportionately costly
compared with preventing other interpersonal workplace injuries. If
excused, selective indifference is non-discriminatory.
Posner suggests ways in which sexual harassment prevention
measures may indeed be disproportionately costly compared with
measures against other interpersonal workplace harms. 3 He also
suggests ways in which anti-harassment measures may be
disproportionately weak in cost-effectiveness. 3' He comes up with three
points distinguishing sexual harassment from other interpersonal
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id.
See Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1190-92.
See id. at 1191.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1191.
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workplace injuries: (1) it cannot ever be fully extirpated; (2) it may be
hard to police because it outwardly resembles flirtation; and (3) antiharassment surveillance may be deeply intrusive upon workers."'
Posner might have added two other items: (1) harassment's intentional,
self-serving and often covert nature, and (2) its frequency. Separately or
together, these features may distinguish harassment from other
interpersonal workplace harms enough to excuse selective indifference,
rendering it non-discriminatory.
Of course, sexual harassment's frequency may seem an odd
justification for failure to act against it. However, frequency does
magnify the costs of successful prevention action. True, it also
augments harassment's disparate impact on women and the hints of
discriminatory intent in ignoring it. Frequency also magnifies sexual
harassment's
productivity
costs
compared
with
other
employee-interpersonal workplace harms, and this must be set off
against the higher costs of eliminating it in an overall assessment of
costliness and cost-effectiveness. But Posner's point remains that the
discriminatory aspect of selective inaction against sexual harassment
cannot be measured without considering possible disproportions in
prevention cost and cost-effectiveness.
Opinions may differ on whether sexual harassment differs enough
from other interpersonal workplace harm in prevention cost or costeffectiveness to justify selective inaction. It is useful to have the issue
raised. But some puzzling questions are also raised by Posner's
reasoning. One stems from his stress on sexual harassment's -disparate
anti-women impact. This focus makes it difficult to explain how
male-victim or same-sex harassment equals discrimination. Another
question concerns his premise that nondiscriminatory inaction is
perfectly constitutional. Both questions highlight the advantage of
conceptualizing harassment as a due process personhood offense,
regardless of discrimination. Conceptualizing non-prevention of
harassment as a due process personhood offense recasts several points
Posner raises: (1) it suggests that inaction on harassment may be
unconstitutional, even if nondiscriminatory; (2) it avoids pressure to
seek a pattern of incidents and inaction so that "discrimination" can be
identified as a prerequisite to liability; and (3) it explains how
male-victim and same-sex harassment are actionable, despite lack of
disparate impact.
The essential point is that inaction against harassment, even if non132. See id.
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discriminatory, may constitute a due process personhood offense. This
is true if the inaction is sufficiently culpable to embody contempt for
personhood. If there is no constitutional offense except where inaction
against harassment is highly culpable, the duty to prevent third-party
harm is kept to manageable scope.
Fear of overly broad duty to prevent haunts all jurisprudence of
third-party harm. No party, not even the state, should be required to
serve as a roving good Samaritan, fending off all menace. Where private
parties are so burdened, their independent life pursuits may be
subordinated to the task of protecting others. Where the state is so
burdened, it may impose controls and regulations in order to meet its
duty that undermine civil liberty. Still, there are situations where failure
to intervene against third-party harm shocks the conscience. This may
be true where a party has a special relationship to the victim or to the
perpetrator. It may also be true where the threatened harm is great, the
cost of intervention low, and the likelihood of successful intervention
high.
Where both victim and perpetrator are employees, the employer
arguably has a special relationship to each. Those special relationships
arguably impose special duties: to protect victims and to curb
perpetrators. Enhancing this "special" character of the employment
relationship is that difficulties of prompt exit tie employees to their
particular employers. This gives the relationship a quasi-custodial
character that may bring employers under some further duty to protect
employees. Furthermore, some workplace harassment is both deeply
harmful and easily preventable. All of these factors justify a limited
affirmative employer duty to protect employees from harassment.
Posner slights all this when he assumes that a municipality may
constitutionally tolerate all interpersonal workplace harm, so long as its
inaction is non-discriminatory.' 33 Posner notwithstanding, such inaction
may offend fundamental constitutional personhood rights protected by
the Constitution. Where a municipal employee faces severe harassment
of any kind, her plight may not simply be ignored. A municipality that
fails to intervene must at least offer some valid reason. This requirement
of a valid reason for inaction tracks Posner's conception of the
prevention duty, and dispenses with his focus on discrimination.
Existing due process jurisprudence under § 1983 supports the
notion of a municipal duty, a limited one, to prevent workplace
harassment. To be sure, one important case, Collins v. City of Harker
133.

See id.
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Heights,'M seems to belie any such duty. The decedent in that case died
of asphyxia while working for the city in a manhole.'35 Plaintiff, the
decedent's widow, sued the city for infringing due process personhood
rights, but the complaint was ruled non-actionable on grounds that the
city had no per se constitutional duty to provide its employees safe work
conditions. 13 6 The Supreme Court reasoned first that the employment
relationship was voluntary, not custodial, and second that workplace
safety levels were a matter of contested costs, benefits, and priorities
properly left to municipal discretion, not dictated by constitutional
norms. 37 This might seem to preclude any municipal obligation to
protect employees from workplace harassment. But though Collins
limits municipal duty to prevent job dangers, it does not repudiate all
duty.'38 Instead, it focuses on certain items of neglect (lack of safety
training and failure to warn of known dangers) and finds them not
"conscience-shocking."' 3 9
But this implies there could be municipal callousness toward
employee safety that would be conscience-shocking. It is hard to
understand how Collins did not see non-supply of safety equipment as
conscience-shocking. Be that as it may, its standard of conscience-shock
is not the same as a blanket no-duty rule.
A more careful analysis than Collins's can be found in L.W. v
Grubbs.'4 In Grubbs, a prison nurse, terrorized and raped by an inmate,
pressed a due process claim under § 1983.1'4 According to Grubbs,
Collins does not rule that no constitutional duty whatever is owed to
protect employees from third-party harm.' 42 If deliberately indifferent to
preventing her harm, defendants may be liable. The court seems to
regard deliberate indifference and conscience-shock as functionally
equivalent. 43 Arguably, employment could be deemed a relationship of
either enhanced ("custodial") or diminished ("voluntary or assumed
risk") duty compared with baseline duties owed generally to citizens
under § 1983. Grubbs seems to adopt neither the enhanced- nor the

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

503 U.S. 115 (1992).
See Collins, 503 U.S. at 117.
See id.
See id. at 128.
See id. at 129.
See id. at 126, 128-29.
974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992).
See Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 120.
See id. at 122.
See id.
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diminished-duty view, perhaps because they offset each other.1" Instead,
Grubbs seizes in on the classic affirmative-duty issue whether
defendants created the danger which befell the plaintiff. 145 If so, they
owed her a duty of protection.
Grubbs understands danger creation to include facilitating or
creating opportunity for third-party harm. 146 Facilitating opportunity lies
in municipal failure to control the inmates despite knowledge of their
dangerous proclivities. The Grubbs defendants were individual state
employees, not a municipality.'47 But there is no big stretch in extending
Grubbs to municipalities, not just individual officials, and to workplace
harassment, not just physical assault. Where the harassment is
sufficiently substantial, foreseeable, and preventable without undue
cost, municipal indifference amounts to facilitating harm. This means
there should be liability for municipal failure to prevent serious,
foreseeable and easily preventable harassment. Some critics might
consider such liability appropriate for physical harm but misplaced for
non-physical harm like harassment. But to preclude liability for
non-physical harm, no matter how egregious, devalues important
personhood rights. Liability for conscience-shocking infliction of
non-physical harm is embodied in the tort known as intentional
infliction of emotional distress. When municipalities or officials
facilitate such harm through deliberate indifference toward prevention,
they should incur liability for offense to constitutional personhood
rights.
Of course, the duty should be narrowly circumscribed. It must
weigh considerations of special relationship, custody, severity of
harassment, prevention costs and cost-effectiveness, and negative
third-party consequences, like increased surveillance and control of
workforces. However, negative aspects of the duty should not blind us
to the point of principle calling for vindication: the right to be left alone.
The cross-cutting factors pertinent to delineating the proper scope of
duty must be folded into a single intuitive standard, one that balances
competing concerns and allows for fact-sensitive adjudication. It is hard
to improve on the deliberate indifference formula ubiquitous in § 1983
jurisprudence and implicitly endorsed by Posner. Because the same
factors arise for all employers and all forms of harassment, the

144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 122.

147. See id.
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deliberate indifference standard could wisely be applied to workplace
harassment of all kinds, sexual and otherwise, public employer and
private. Specifically, deliberate indifference might be the right standard
for defining employer duty to prevent harassment under Title VII.
C. Non-ConstitutionalApplication of the PersonhoodParadigm
The due process personhood approach has implications back in the
world of non-constitutional anti-harassment jurisprudence under Title
VII and common law tort. It suggests that "discrimination" is a distorted
and superficial conceptualization of the wrong inherent in harassment.
A more penetrating and fundamental conceptualization of that wrong is
one of assaulted personhood. "Discrimination" is secondary or
incidental to that fundamental wrong and, in many cases, completely
absent.'48 Arguments for decisional or statutory expansions of Title VII
employer anti-harassment duties-to cover same-sex harassment, for
example, or workplace harassment generally-ironically spotlight the
assaulted personhood nature of anti-harassment law as they stretch the
employment discrimination model to the breaking point."9
Harassment can fruitfully be analyzed and treated as a tort, not
employment discrimination. 50 Employer liability harassment under Title
VII should therefore be re-examined. Such liability essentially burdens
employers with a duty to prevent harassment that is overbroad under
tort principles.' The wisdom of this broad employer duty is doubtful, as
argued above. It burdens employers, encourages tighter employer
control over work forces, and accomplishes little in curtailing
harassment. 5 2 It may be good to expand harassment liability, but not
against employers as in employment discrimination. Instead, liability
should be targeted at individual harassers as tortfeasors with employers
liable only insofar as they too are tortfeasors. 3 In general, showings of
individual tortious conduct and injury should be required for harassment
148. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassmentas a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment
Liability Should Be Curtailed,30 CoNN. L. REv. 375, 382 (1998).
149. See id. at 386-87.
150. See id. at 382; see also Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes,75
TEX. L. REv. 1539 (1997) (discussing sexual harassment as a new tort); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual
Harassment as Sex Discrimination:A Defective Paradigm,8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333 (1990)
(explaining the new tort of sexual harassment).
151. See Hager, supra note 148, at 428.
152. See id at 389.
153. See Kathryn K. Hensiak, Comment, When the Boss Steps Over the Line: Supervisor
Liability Under Title VII, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 645, 663-64 (1997).
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liability.'" By this token, individual harassers should be liable according
to the requirements of tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 5 ' Employers should be liable according to the requirements of
tort claims for negligent hiring/retention/supervision.'56
D. Nature of the Wrong: DiscriminationandDiscriminatoryIntent
Intriguing issues concerning the nature and wrongfulness of
harassment come to light by juxtaposing § 1983's concept of actionable
discrimination with Title VII's.'5 7 A case of unconstitutional
discrimination under § 1983 requires proof of discriminatory intent. 5
Employment discrimination under Title VII requires no such6 proof of
intent.'59 It can be established based on disparate impact alone 0
As argued above, there is a deep ambiguity in the notion that
harassment-certain forms of it at least-amounts to discrimination in
the first place. 6' With erotic overtures, the harasser's motives are not
primarily ones of contempt for the target, nor is the harassment directed
at an entire sex. Instead, the harassment is elicited by the eroticized
features of a particular person. To be sure, excessive or improper
attention may invade that person's right to be left alone or set terms for
interaction.' 62 When egregious, such harassment may be deeply harmful
and should be actionable. 63 However, the notion that it constitutes
discrimination is strange.' 64
Though several notions can be offered on how erotic harassment
equals discrimination, none is especially plausible. One is that because
erotic fixation is elicited by the target's sex, the harassment reflects
discriminatory intent or treatment by the harasser.' 65 This makes little

154. See Hager, supranote 148, at 426-29.
155. See id. at 432.
156. See id. at 426.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); id. §§ 2000e to e-17.
158. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); Parker v. Board of Sch.
Comm'rs, 729 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1984).
159. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,798-99 (1973).
160. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).
161. See Hager, supra note 148, at 376.
162. See Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Can It Be Sex-Related for
Purposesof Title VII, 1 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 25, 49 (1997).
163. See id.
164. See Hager, supra note 148; Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?,49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 692-98 (1997).
165. See Kara L. Gross, Note, Toward Gender Equality and Understanding:Recognizing
That Same-Sex Sexual HarassmentIs Sex Discrimination, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1165, 1212-14
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sense because erotic attraction is seldom elicited by all members of a
given sex, but instead from particular qualities of the eroticized person.
It would be bizarre to treat particular attractions as episodes of
"discrimination" against folks with wavy hair, fierce intelligence, silky
skin, quirky humor, shapely shoulders, generous spirits, and killer
smiles. There is no right not to be eroticized by others. There is a right
not to have one's autonomy, dignity, and privacy invaded nonconsensually for reasons erotic or otherwise.'6 However, that has
nothing to do with discrimination. '67
A second notion of harassment as discrimination seizes not on the
perpetrator's motivation, but on the negative experience or
circumstances created for victims. This resonates roughly with notions
of discriminatory impact under Title VII. ' But the resonance is rough
indeed because discriminatory impact classically refers to the retarding
effect of some employment practice upon an entire class such as
women. 69 This is not the typical erotic harassment scenario, where the
negative impact of overtures is experienced by particular people, not a
whole sex. Though some envision generalized anti-woman effect from
"targeted" erotic harassment, that seems contrived. It abstracts away
from particular harassment incidents and workplaces by modeling erotic
overtures as a social institution with presumptive and generalized
adverse impact on the female sex. Even if this model has some truth for
women, it does not explain how harassment of men or same-sex
harassment count as discrimination. And even for women, it lies far
afield from standard Title VII disparate impact analysis. It aggregates
incidents across society and then assumes a socially aggregate disparate
impact, rather than proving disparate impact case by case in particular
workplaces, as in classic disparate impact jurisprudence.
The contention that erotic harassment, with its focus on a particular
person should not count as discrimination may seem to stumble over a
well-recognized principle of discrimination law under both Title VII
and § 1983. Mistreatment need not reach all available class members to
count as discrimination.' 70 Intentional discrimination against even one
(1996).
166. See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence
of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1780, 1786-87 (1992).
167. See Hager, supra note 148, at 382.
168. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1994).
169. See E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: the Myth of the Protected
Class in Title VI DisparateTreatment Cases, 30 CoNN. L. REV. 441,447-448 (1998).
170. See Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 28 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1274, 1278 (E.D.
La. 1976).
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person because of his or her group identity counts as discrimination.'
On the issue of erotic harassment, however, this principle is more
question-begging than dispositive. The question is precisely whether
erotic harassment is "intentional discrimination... because of' the
target's gender identity. It is purely sophistic to conclude the answer is
yes.
Despite this, treatment of harassment as discrimination is now
thickly entrenched in Title VII. It has never been clear whether and how
harassment should be mapped onto Title VII's categories of
discriminatory treatment and disparate impact. The discussion just
above highlights that erotic overture harassment differs from both
discriminatory intent and disparate impact in their conventional
meanings. Erotic harassment typically involves neither animus nor
class-wide effect. This lack of fit is further reason for skepticism on
conceptualizing erotic overtures as discrimination.
Puzzlement only deepens in the wake of the 1991 amendments to
the Title VII structure. Those amendments provide for the first time that
punitive and compensatory damages may be awarded for Title VII
violations.' The newly-available compensatory damages are limited to
cases of "intentional discrimination' 7 3 and punitive damages are limited
to situations of "malice" or "reckless indifference" to protected rights. 4
For harassment suits, this forces confrontation with a previously
neglected issue: whether and when harassment falls within the category
of intentional discrimination. My guess is that courts have routinely
treated harassment as intentional discrimination under the 1991
amendments for purposes of awarding damages. This is difficult to
verify because, to date, only one decision, Canada v. Boyd Group,
Inc.,' has squarely addressed the issue. Its analysis is obscure at best.
Canada rules that hostile environment harassment does constitute
intentional discrimination, at least for purposes of awarding
compensatory damages. 6 Though discriminatory intent conventionally
requires proof in particular cases, Canada invokes jurisprudence that
because discriminatory intent may be hard to prove directly, it can be
presumed upon establishing a "prima facie case of discrimination.""
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See Woerner v. Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517,519-20 (N.D. 111.1981).
See 1991 Amendments, Pub. L. 102-66 (1991).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1994).
See id. § 1981a(b)(1).
809 F. Supp. 771 (D. Nev. 1992).
See Canada, 809 F. Supp. at 781.
Id.
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This presumption effectively winds up treating all hostile environment
cases as intentional discrimination, though many-erotic overture cases
especially-are completely devoid of employer animus.
In superficial compliance with earlier jurisprudence, Canada
allows inference of discriminatory intent upon establishment of a prima
facie case. 78 The problem is that for hostile environment cases, the
elements of a prima facie actionability are not nearly demanding enough
to justify such a presumption. The presumption jurisprudence stems
from cases of denied tangible job benefits: positions, pay, promotions,
and the like. To establish a prima facie case, a grievant must
demonstrate basic eligibility for the denied benefit, whereupon the
employer is called to offer a non-discriminatory reason for denying it."
If no such reason can be offered, an inference of discriminatory animus
makes sense.
However, this makes no sense for hostile environment, which is by
definition not concerned with tangible prerequisites. Canada does not
explain or even ask what prima facie showing should be required to
establish a presumption of animus in hostile environment cases. It
probably comes down to the minimum pleading elements for stating a
claim: sexual behavior causing impeded work environment. But that
prima facie case, because it does not deal with tangible benefits or
grievant eligibility for them, does nothing to strengthen an inference
that animus is afoot. On the contrary, actionability for hostile
environment either presumes the presence of animus axiomatically and
irrebuttably, or else jettisons the animus element entirely. The two
descriptions produce functionally identical outcomes: animus is not an
active pleading element.
Axiomatic presumption of discriminatory intent is especially
misplaced for erotic overtures, but may be equally misplaced for all
hostile environment cases except the vanishingly rare ones where the
harasser acts as true employer agent. At any rate, if hostile environment
axiomatically means discriminatory intent, there is no need for the
subterfuge of prima facie cases and presumptions in order to establish it.
If we are not actually inquiring about animus, but simply declaring it
present, let's say so. Alternatively, if animus is in principle irrelevant to
hostile environment actionability, let's say so, not conjure intentional
discrimination damages by sleight-of-hand involving misplaced prima
facie cases and presumptions that magically wind up finding animus
178. See id.
179. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
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every time.
Canada's reasoning grows even more opaque when it comes to
analyzing how the prima facie presumption of discriminatory intent may
be rebutted. Opportunity for rebuttal is crucial in benefit denial cases,
allowing defendants to offer reasons for the denials other than animus.
In the hostile environment context, however, the notion of rebuttal is as
hollow as the notions of prima facie case and presumption that precede
it. There can be no non-animus rebuttal to an animus presumption built
on a prima facie case (sexual conduct causing impeded work
environment) which is not factually probative of animus in the first
place, but instead either presumes animus or ignores it.
Not surprisingly then, Canada'snotion of rebuttal is conceptually
empty. The ruling indicates that the presumption of animus can be
rebutted either by defeating the prima facie case or by showing
appropriate remedial action.' Both alternatives essentially allow
rebuttal of discriminatory intent, thus negating damages, only by
defeating the hostile environment case in its entirety. Therefore, there is
no such thing as a valid hostile environment case not involving
discriminatory intent and all hostile environment cases will thereby
warrant damages. This clarifies that we are dealing with an axiom:
hostile environment equals discriminatory intent. But again, that axiom
is deeply perplexing.
All this is not to say that damages should not be available for
hostile environment harassment. They should be available for the right
parties and for the right reason: chiefly from individual harassers for
assaulting personhood rights. But Congress has thrown matters into
great confusion by making intentional discrimination the prerequisite
for damages, compounding confusion already rampant in equating
hostile environment with employment discrimination. Puzzlement
deepens again when § 1983 law is juxtaposed. Courts routinely invoke
the axiom that unconstitutional discrimination requires proof of intent,
even if employment discrimination does not.' Therefore, in § 1983
harassment claims, courts strain to articulate and apply an element for
prima facie actionability they need not contend with under Title VII:
discriminatory intent.
Though some rulings note the intent requirement as a theoretical
distinction between § 1983 and Title VII, it seldom makes any real
difference. Some § 1983 cases mention the issue, but give no serious
180. See id. at 780.
181. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 924,925 (11th Cir. 1985).
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analysis.' The intent requirement winds up empty of content. The line
it theoretically draws between § 1983 and Title VII jurisprudence
vaporizes.
A few § 1983 decisions intriguingly depart from this weightless
notion of the intent requirement. They apply a heftier intent
requirement, though not the one contemplated in classic equal
protection jurisprudence: discriminatory animus. 8 Erotic harassment
cases would almost never be actionable under a requirement of
discriminatory animus." Even those courts applying a hefty, non-empty
notion of discriminatory intent stop short of requiring animus.8' Instead,
their notion of the intent requirement is essentially an exclusion for a
certain category of cases: soured romances.'86 There is no liability for
harassment in the context of romances gone sour because harassment
pursuant to soured romances is deemed to lack requisite discriminatory
intent. "
The argument is that there is no discriminatory intent in purely
personal harassment.'88 Soured-romance harassment is purely personal
because it stems from the perpetrator's relationship with a particular
person, not from her sex. It is therefore not discriminatory. This
reasoning is sound, but proves too much. As I argue above, erotic
harassment stems from fixations on particular persons. The target's sex
is necessary but hardly sufficient to fuel the fixation. This is true of
soured romances, but equally true of any unrequited fixation. If taken
seriously, the "purely personal" notion marks no true middle ground
between broad and narrow conceptions of discriminatory intent, but
instead confines it to its narrowest scope-animus against one sex or the
other. That makes sense. It means that no erotic harassment should be
182. See Cross v. State of Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1995); Howard v.
Town of Jonesville, 935 F. Supp. 855, 859-60 (W.D. La. 1996); Ascolese v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351, 359-60 (E.D. Pa 1996); Farrell v. State of New
York, 946 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth.,
852 F. Supp. 1512, 1532-33 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
183. See Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1151 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that "soured
romance scenario" is not covered as intentional discrimination requirement under the equal
protection clause); Huebschen v. Department of Health and Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1172 (7th
Cir. 1983) (stating that discrimination by a female supervisor against a male employee was not
motivated by his male status, but rather his status as "former lover who had jilted her").
184. See Trautvetter, 916 F.2d at 1151.
185. See id.

186. See id.
187.
188.
189.

See id.; Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1172.
See Trautvetter, 916 F.2d at 1151.
See id.; Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1172.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol16/iss2/1

34

Hager: Harassment and Constitutional Tort: The Other Jurisprudence

1999]

Harassmentand ConstitutionalTort

actionable as discrimination.
It might be thought that though erotic overtures in general should
indeed count as discrimination, no liability should apply to souredromances because the target has assumed the risk, so to speak. But even
if romance arguably entails assuming the risk of post-romance
harassment, the target's assumption of risk has nothing to do with the
question of the perpetrator's discriminatory intent.
Erotic harassment might also be thought to differ in general from
the narrower category of soured-romances because erotic harassers
focus on a series of targets, not just one. This suggests the behavior is
directed at an entire sex, not at particular persons. But this image of
non-selective harassers is pure hyperbole. Hyperbole aside, no one
fixates erotically on everyone of a given sex. If someone's harassment
focuses on everyone of a given sex, it does bespeak animus, not eros.
True erotic harassment is intrinsically selective, even if some harassers
select more than one.
Again, my point is not that erotic harassment should never be
actionable. On the contrary, it should be actionable under the right
circumstances, but not as discrimination. Instead, erotic harassment, if
egregious, should be actionable under § 1983 as a substantive due
process offense of assaulted personhood. Because such rights are not
waived in a romance, I believe there is no per se reason for excluding
soured-romance harassment from liability.
The strange twist is that the "purely personal" analysis, soberly
applied, seems every bit as relevant to Title VII discrimination as to §
1983, even though it emerges from the intent requirement that
supposedly separates § 1983 from Title VII. The particularized personal
focus in erotic harassment makes its Title VII actionability as
discrimination dubious, or should. Likewise with equal protection
actionability under § 1983.
From the standpoint of affording relief, it might not matter much
under § 1983 if erotic harassment is deemed non-actionable as
discrimination, so long as it remains actionable as assault upon
personhood. All harassment currently actionable would remain so,
against identical defendants, unless not egregious enough to be
conscience-shocking. Indeed, actionability would partly broaden
because there would be no enclaves of non-actionability due to lack of
discrimination or discriminatory intent.
With Title VII, however, abandoning the discrimination paradigm
would have more complex effects. Where there is no discrimination,
there is no Title VII actionability against employers, therefore no Title
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VII actionability period, except under the dubious minority view that
private individuals, as employer "agents," should be individually liable
under Title VII.' Therefore, curtailing the discrimination focus, though
it could widen the world of harassing acts made actionable under §
1983, would curtail Title VII claims against employers. Private sector
employers would then be answerable for erotic harassment only within
the contours of common law duty. That duty would not encompass
responsibility for erotic harassment, except in unusual circumstances.
That is as it should be. The employer's duty to control erotic fixation
among employees should be narrow. Instead, legal control over such
harm should lie in the realm of personal injury lawsuits.' 9 l Public
employers, though excused from Title VII responsibility, would retain
their potential erotic harassment liability under § 1983. That too is as it
should be, provided it is no broader than established contours of
municipal liability under § 1983.
E. Nature of the Wrong: Damages
Damages jurisprudence under § 1983 subtly reinforces the
personhood paradigm for understanding anti-harassment rights and
undermines the discrimination paradigm. Under established
jurisprudence, monetary damages under § 1983 must be geared toward
compensating plaintiffs for specific and actual personal damages.'2 This
may include pain and suffering and emotional distress, but not sums for
abstract offense to the right in question.193 In tort-like fashion, damages
must measure harm to the person, not offense to constitutional values as
such. 94
This doctrine casts a weird light over damages for harassment
under the equal protection clause. A plaintiff may not be compensated
for the purported offense to equality in the abstract.'95 She may be
compensated only for whatever harm-mainly emotional distress in a
typical case-the purported offense to equality causes her. The strange
part is that little of harassment's emotional distress typically comes

190. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassmentas a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment
Liability Should Be Curtailed,30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 388-89 (1998).
191. See id.
192. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306-08 (1986); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-58 (1978).
193. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310.
194. Seeid. at311.
195. Seeid.at310.
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from a feeling of disparaged equality. It stems instead from the outrage
to personhood: assaulted dignity, autonomy, and privacy. A harassed
woman feels less distressed that the harassment is not happening to the
men around her than because it is happening to her. Damages stemming
from outraged equality as such may often be zero.
This does not mean she should receive no compensation for her
distress. The point is that equal protection logic, closely followed, might
not really provide it. This problem is avoided, however, if harassment is
grasped as an offense to personhood rights. Such rights embrace
freedom from unjustly-inflicted distress, including sexual harassment.
Full compensation for that distress flows smoothly from the nature of
the right offended.
The rule against abstract constitutional damages leaves an
intriguing ambiguity in § 1983 damages jurisprudence. Emotional
distress is compensable while abstract offense to constitutional values is
not.' Is there an intermediate category for affront to personhood,
experienced as damage, but not as emotional distress? Should such an
item be compensable? Several causes of action in tort have traditionally
afforded recovery for damaged dignity, aside from any pecuniary, pain
and suffering, and aside from emotional distress damages. So-called
presumed or dignitarian damages are normal for defamation, offensive
battery, and lack of informed consent, to name several. Such damages
could be called "noumenal" in that they compensate for nonempirical
outrage to human dignity, not for empirical suffering of any sort,
physical or emotional.'97 Such noumenal dignitarian damages could
perhaps be recognized for the assault on personhood entailed in
harassment. But it is not obvious how to separate noumenal personhood
damages from nonrecoverable abstract offense damages.
If not compensating for emotional distress or other empirical
damage, noumenal damages seem indistinguishable from abstract
offense damages. If so, they are non-recoverable. Some observers
196. Seeid. at310-11.
197. With apologies, I borrow the term "noumenal" loosely from Kant's philosophy. Kant
uses the term "noumenal" to refer to the transcendental existence of a thing, the thing in itself,
inaccessible to empirical experience or knowledge. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK
FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALs 59 (1981). I use the term here to capture an idea of damage to
personhood aside from any experience of pain or suffering by the damaged person. See id. A
comparable term for such damage would be "dignitarian," but I use the term "noumenal" to
suggest theoretically possible categories of damage which are not empirical pain, suffering, or
distress, but are also not damages to "dignity" as such. See id. For example, could there be damage
to noumenal "equality," distinct from noumenal "dignity"? My answer, as explained in the text, is
"No," but I find the question intriguing.
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suggest that noumenal individual damages, aside from emotional
distress and other actual damages, should be recoverable under § 1983
for all constitutional infringements.' 98 This would require recognizing a
distinction between recoverable noumenal damages and nonrecoverable abstract offense damages. However, such a distinction
verges on double-talk. Noumenal damages seem to be just abstract
offense damages in drag. If so, allowing noumenal damages subverts the
rule forbidding abstract damages. But the rule against abstract
constitutional damages should not be allowed to frustrate award of
noumenal damages for assaulted personhood. With noumenal
personhood rights, unlike other rights, there is no offense to the abstract
constitutional value without a simultaneous dignitarian offense to a
particular person. The noumenal personal damage should not be made
nonrecoverable by thoughtless application of the rule banning recovery
for abstract offenses.
The distinction between abstract and noumenal damages is real, not
just double-talk, for this one particular class of case: when the offense in
question consists purely and simply of assaulted personhood. That is
precisely what harassment entails. Because dignity of personhood is
exactly the abstract constitutional value in question, noumenal
personhood damage has been inflicted whenever the abstract
constitutional value has been offended. If this noumenal damage is
non-recoverable, victims go personally uncompensated for precisely the
harm to personhood that makes up the constitutional offense in
question. A distinct item of personhood damages would delineate the
dignitarian individual offense involved. This logic applies only to
dignitarian personhood rights and does not expand to swallow the entire
ban on abstract offense damages for other types of violation. Or does it?
In this hazy realm, it is interesting to pose the discrimination
question again. If harassment is generally a personhood offense
warranting noumenal or dignitarian damages, does it sometimes also
violate equal protection (i.e., harassment motivated by actual
anti-woman animus)? If so, could there be an item of noumenal
compensatory damages for discrimination in addition to the one for
offended personhood? Such an item would demarcate a personal interest
in equal dignity, beyond the interest in fundamental personal dignity.
198. See Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of ConstitutionalRights, 67
CAL. L. REv. 1242, 1245-46, 1285 (1979); Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A
Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966, 976-80 (1980); Jean C. Love,
Presumed General Compensatory Damages in ConstitutionalTort Litigation:A CorrectiveJustice
Perspective,49 WAsH. & LEEL. REv. 67, 71 (1992).
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But can such a personal interest in equal dignity be distinguished from
the abstract constitutional value of equal protection, so that damages for
individualized offense to noumenal equality could be awarded without
violating the rule against abstract offense damages?
The answer is no, because a right of equal treatment is derivative
from fundamental respect for personhood. There is one fundamental
noumenal personhood right, not two. To conceptualize two separate
noumenal
personhood
interests-fundamental
respect
and
non-discrimination-posits that discriminatory disrespect is somehow
more damaging than non-discriminatory disrespect. But disrespect is not
an experience that comes in two classes: discriminatory (worse) and
non-discriminatory (not as bad). Because discrimination, if present, is
incidental to the fundamental personhood harm inflicted by harassment,
noumenal damages should lie only for offense to personhood, not for
discrimination. Noumenal compensatory damages for discrimination
would be indistinguishable from impermissible abstract equal protection
damages.
Still, there is a place where damages for discriminatory harassment
have their proper home. That place is punitive damages. To harass with
discriminatory animus is especially reprehensible. Wrongful contempt
for personhood is compounded by animus or bigotry. Evidence of
animus or bigotry should therefore be admissible for punitives, though
ruled out for compensatories.
There is currently an odd aspect in Title VII law that provokes
further thought on the theme of damages and the nature of the wrong
involved in hostile environment harassment. This is that the 1991
amendments seem to authorize tort-like compensatory and punitive
damages,"' but the Supreme Court's ruling in Harris authorizes a
hostile environment claim to be stated even in the absence of any
tortious injury.2' This juxtaposition reveals how hostile environment
harassment under Title VII dwells in a twilight zone between
discrimination and tort.
As noted above, the 1991 amendments authorize compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional discrimination. If compensatory
damages for harassment have become routine since enactment of the
amendments, it makes sense in two respects. First, given the
juxtaposition of the 1991 amendments with the Hill-Thomas hearings
and surrounding uproar over sexual harassment, allowing compensatory
199.
200.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1994).
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,22 (1993).
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damages for harassment probably reflects Congressional intent. Second,
even if it is not intentional discrimination, hostile environment
harassment is a form of intentional wrongdoing causing personal
damage. Through this tort-like lens, recoverability of compensatory
(and punitive) damages seems completely fitting. (Whether such
damages should be recoverable from employers, as under Title VII,
remains a separate question). Meanwhile, Harris establishes that
plaintiffs need not plead tortious injury to sue for harassment."s ' Harris
rules specifically that plaintiffs need not plead psychological injury to
state a claim.202 If you need not plead even psychological damage, much
less any more tangible damage, your claim seems not to sound in tort.
This makes sense within the discrimination perspective: if harassment is
at least sometimes discrimination, why should actionability require
pleading tort damages? Damages should lie instead for
discrimination-caused harm.
But this is puzzling because hostile environment harassment by
definition does not concern denials of tangible benefits. For
discriminatory benefit denials, damages center on having the denied
benefits granted. With hostile environment there is no such relief. What
then are the damages?
In a hostile environment case with no conventional tortious injury,
would a compensatory award be proper, and if so, for what? There are
four imaginable items of damage distinguishable from classic
discrimination remedies on the one hand and conventional tort remedies
on the other: (1) compensation for non-tangible retardation of
employment performance, prospects or progress; (2) damages for
abstract offense to 6onstitutional equality values; (3) compensation for
offense to noumenal personal equality rights; and (4) compensation for
offense to noumenal personhood rights, aside from psychic or physical
harm. Should a court allow itemizable compensatory damages on any or
all of these grounds? Because the last item fits best with preexisting
doctrine, it makes the best sense of Harris.
Non-tangible employment retardation (1), if not simply presumed
but subjected to case specific proof, may be too speculative to comport
with conventional damages law. Damages for abstract equality offense
(2) must quickly be ruled out if § 1983 jurisprudence is treated as
authoritative on the meaning of compensatory relief. If abstract offense
damages are out, noumenal equality damages (3) are also out, as I argue
201. See id.
202. See id.
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above.
Therefore, Harris and the 1991 amendments make most sense
together if the compensatory relief specifically proper for a hostile
environment, without any psychic or physical injury, is noumenal
personhood damage. The essential tort character of such relief reveals a
subtle misstep in Harris.In articulating the minimum damage a hostile
environment claim must plead, Harris should have proposed disparaged
dignity or personhood, not damaged work performance. However, such
a correction would require a further reconceptualization of what it takes
to state a hostile environment claim, because it rebounds into the
conduct element for pleading a claim. Damage to dignity of personhood
implies conscious disrespect for victim by perpetrator. Dignity is not
assaulted through mere inadvertence. There is no outrage to dignity
absent contempt by the perpetrator. Defining hostile environment
harassment merely as conduct of a sexual nature is therefore too broad.
Because hostile environment damage sounds essentially in dignitarian
assault on personhood, actionability should require a pleading of
conscious disrespect. This conscious disrespect could be called
"deliberate indifference." That would fit with doctrinal rhetoric and
structures already richly developed under § 1983, where "deliberate
indifference" is a master jurisprudential concept.
F. Same-Sex Harassment:From Sex Discriminationto Anti-Gay
Discriminationto Assaulted Personhood
Cases of same-sex harassment raise thorny issues for Title VII's
model of harassment as sex discrimination. Some of those issues need
not arise under § 1983, which can approach cases of same-sex
harassment without being constrained to conceptualize it as sex
discrimination. This theme is worth exploring for two main reasons.
First, it highlights ambiguities in Title VI's project of conceptualizing
harassment as sex discrimination. Second, it may provide concrete
assistance to same-sex harassment victims in municipal workplaces.
Courts have grappled with and split over the question whether
"same-sex" harassment qualifies for Title VII actionability. 23 The
Supreme Court settled at least part of the issue in Oncale v. Sundowner

203. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 570-74 (7th Cir. 1997); Lucero-Nelson v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 1998); Williams v. District of
Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1996).
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Offshore Services, Inc.,2 which rules that at least some types of samesex harassment are actionable under Title VII as sex discrimination.0 5
The simple justice of allowing actionability for same-sex misconduct if
it would be actionable in an opposite-sex setting does not belie certain
anomalies.
It is strange to conceptualize same-sex harassment under the
statutory meaning of discrimination based on "sex." Congress
unquestionably understood "sex" discrimination to mean disregard
based on male or female status... 6 It has always been a stretch to apply
the notion of discrimination to erotic advances which often entail no
such disregard, even if they are unwelcome. But unwelcome erotic
advances can loosely be understood as discrimination if the focus is that
the target's sex is part of what elicits the advance. One can even suggest
that erotic advances, unwelcome ones at least, inherently imply gender
contempt, though this idea is more than a little strange. Whatever the
rationale or lack thereof, unwelcome heterosexual advances have been
classed as sex discrimination under Title VII.207 In light of these
developments, treating unwelcome gay advances as sex discrimination
involves no additional anomaly. Oncale makes this point in ruling that
unwelcome gay advances are actionable under Title VII.20 ' However,
this does not solve the whole problem of Title VII actionability for
same-sex harassment, which does not always involve erotic advances.
The complexities can be highlighted with a partial taxonomy of
same-sex harassment scenarios, distinguishing four paradigms: (1)
straight perpetrator/gay target ("gay-bashing" derision); (2) straight
perpetrator/straight target (mistreatment through sex-oriented talk or
behavior); (3) gay perpetrator/gay target (erotic overtures); and (4) gay
perpetrator/straight target (erotic overtures). For conceptualization as
sex discrimination, each scenario may require its own distinct theory.
Gay-bashing seems closest to a core meaning of "discrimination"
as contemptuous disregard. The problem for Title VII analysis is that
such disregard is directed at the victim's sexual orientation, not at male
or female status. Because of this focus, actionability for gay-bashing
runs afoul of the fact that Title VII does not ban discrimination based on
sexual orientation.2 9 Whether it should is another question.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
See id.
See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
See Erin J. Law, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: The United States
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Though gay-bashing fits the most common sense meaning of
"discrimination," the irony is that Oncale may exclude gay-bashing
from Title VII actionability. The Court's opinion by Scalia stresses that
same-sex actionability lies for homoerotic advances and also for hostile
abuse based on the victim's male or female status.2 10 This cryptic
emphasis hints by omission that gay-bashing would not be actionable
because it involves hostile abuse based on the victim's sexual
preference, not male or female status as such. Justice Thomas's onesentence concurrence highlights as the reason for concurring the Court's
insistence that same-sex actionability lies only for discrimination
"because ...of sex." 21' Both Thomas and the Court's opinion covertly
invite lower courts to exclude gay-bashing from the realm of
discrimination based on sex. This will be painful irony for gay and
lesbian rights groups who submitted amicus briefs for the plaintiff in
Oncale.1
Mistreatment between straights using sexual talk or behavior seems
furthest from any established meaning of "discrimination." It entails
neither group-based contempt nor erotically-motivated sex selectivity. It
is hard to see why sex-coded words or behavior by themselves turn
mistreatment into discrimination. If employers may be held liable for all
sex-coded mistreatment, why not for all employee mistreatment of each
other? Why single out sex-coded mistreatment? The answer that Title
VII bans discrimination based on "sex"' is unconvincing. That fixation
on the word "sex" obfuscates the central focus: discrimination.
Oncale is perplexing on whether abusive sexual "horseplay"
among straights is actionable under Title VII. It cautions explicitly that
"male-on-male horseplay" should not be deemed actionable. 23 But that
is in the context of warning that there should be no actionability for
harassment not sufficiently severe and pervasive enough to be
abusive.21 1 Oncale itself involves exactly such abusive male-on-male

Supreme Court Holds that Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Is Actionable Under Title VII, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 723, 725-26 (1998) (discussing that sexual orientation discrimination is outside the scope of
Title VII).
210. See Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002.
211. See id.at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring). "[T]he Court stresses that in every sexual
harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's statutory requirement
that there be discrimination because of... sex." Id.
212. Amicus Brief for Petitioner at *1, Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.Ct.
998 (1998), available in 1997 WL 471805.
213. See Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1003.
214. See id.
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sexual horseplay.2 5 The plaintiff was forced to touch the privates of
other men, was threatened with rape, and had a bar of soap pushed up
his anus." 6 The Court's ruling suggests that this is actionable, but leaves
ambiguities at several levels.2 7
Oncale may leave the lower court discretion to find that the abuse
alleged in the case was not "because of... sex."2 On remand, the
lower court could find that the harassment was not inflicted "because
of... sex. ' ' 219 It could find that the plaintiff was abused because his
tormentors thought him gay, and that this is not discrimination "because
of ... sex." Or it could rule that he was abused because his tormentors
just disliked him personally. If the very fact that he is male by itself
makes any abuse of him "discrimination... because of... sex" then
any abuse of anyone by anyone becomes actionable sex discrimination.
On that view, the Court's attempted restriction of actionability to
"discrimination... because of... sex" would be rendered meaningless
and null. The Court's "because of... sex" limitation is clearly designed
to exclude actionability for some same-sex harassment scenarios.2 But
exactly what it excludes is unclear.
Gay-on-gay erotic overtures entail "discrimination" in the form of
gender-selective attraction and thereby seem close to Title VII's
now-accepted theory of sexual advances as discrimination. However,
insofar as the perpetrator knows the target's homosexual orientation,
such advances seem to involve selectivity based on sexual orientation as
much as on male or female status. Therefore, actionability might again
confound the axiom that Title VII does not ban sexual orientation
discrimination."' Nevertheless, Oncale suggests that unwelcome gayon-gay overtures would be actionable, because a gay harasser would not
pursue a member of the opposite sex.2n
Unwelcome gay-on-straight erotic overtures square easiest with
established Title VII theory. Oncale unmistakably rules them
actionable. m They involve selectivity based on attraction, not the
target's sexual orientation, at least not the actual one. Therefore,
215. See id. at 1000-01.
216. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
217. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
218. See id. at 1000.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See Law, supranote 209, at 725-26.
222. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
223. See id. at 1000.
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gay-on-straight overtures seem the scenario for actionability easiest to
square with current doctrine.
Complexities explored in the foregoing paragraphs all stem from a
context of conceptualizing varieties of same-sex harassment under a
heading of sex discrimination.' In the Title VII context, actionability
for same-sex harassment turns entirely on the plausibility of
characterizing it as sex discrimination.' In the world of § 1983,
problems of same-sex harassment and its actionability could be
approached from a very different standpoint because there need be no
tie to the concept of sex discrimination.
Therefore, under § 1983, actionability for at least some same-sex
harassment is less convoluted than under Title VII. Harassment need not
qualify as sex discrimination in order to be actionable under § 1983.226
Harassment under color of state law can be viewed as a deprivation of
constitutionally protected equality or liberty, even if it does not count as
sex discrimination272
Discrimination based on sexual orientation in itself violates
constitutional equal protection.22 Though sexual orientation is not
recognized as a heightened-scrutiny class like sex, the equal protection
clause does not protect only heightened-scrutiny classes.29 It bans
irrational discrimination against any identifiable class." If gays are an
identifiable class, they are protected by the equal protection clause from
discrimination without rational basis.23
Rational basis means a legitimate state purpose.' 2 Because
harassment has no legitimate state purpose, it violates equal protection
when based on a target's sexual orientation. Therefore, gay-bashing
counts as discrimination and should be actionable under § 1983, even if
it is not actionable under Title VII. Conversely, gay-on-straight erotic
overtures hardly count as anti-gay discrimination. Neither does
straight-on-straight abusive sex horseplay. Gay-on-gay overtures
present a mixed picture as anti-gay discrimination. If the inherent
confusion in viewing erotic overtures as discrimination is ignored under
accepted Title VII doctrine, gay-on-gay overtures count as anti-gay
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See id. at 1002.
See id.
See id.
See Wise v. New York City Police Dep't, 928 F. Supp. 355, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).

229. See id. at 635.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 633-34.
232. See id. at 631-32.
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discrimination, violate equal protection, and should therefore be
actionable under § 1983.
Aside from equal protection, there is a more fundamental sense in
which all same-sex harassment may violate the Constitution.
Harassment of any sort under color of law infringes substantive due
process rights. 23 Same-sex harassment, like all harassment, should be
actionable as a due process personhood violation.
1m. DELINEATING EMPLOYER, SUPERVISOR AND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

A. Comparative Contours of HarassmentLiability
Because Title VII lodges liability against "employers," courts have
largely refused to recognize actions against individual employees who
perpetrate harassment.' Title VII's assessment of liability against firms
rather than harassers is its most telling and troubling aspect. By contrast,
under § 1983, courts inquire first about liability against individual
"persons" who engage in or countenance harassment "under color of
law." Meanwhile, insofar as it bars respondeat superior, § 1983 makes it
harder than Title VII does to lodge liability against organizational
entities.'- These differences provide food for thought regarding the
cogency of harassment liability structures.
Under loose and confused applications of "agency" principles,
Title VII holds employers liable for harassment perpetrated by
employees.f 6 This employer liability tortures normal principles of
vicarious liability, especially in hostile environment harassment.21
Because harassment entails intentional misconduct serving no employer
interest, it falls outside normal principles for attributing liability from

233. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-36.
234. See Chatman v. Gentle Dental Ctr. of Waltham, 973 F. Supp. 228, 239 (D. Mass 1997).
"[Tihis court weighs in with the nearly-unanimous view of the federal circuits that an
employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an 'employer,' cannot be held liable
under Title VIP'. Id.
235. See Cheryl L. Anderson, Nothing Personal:IndividualLiability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for Sexual Harassmentas an Equal Protection Claim, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 60, 100
n.253 (1998).
236. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998); Faragher v,Boca
Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (1998). The cases leave open what standard of attribution should be
applied to peer harassment.
237. See Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship:Hostile-Enviroment Harassmentand the
FirstAmendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 501-11 (1991).
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perpetrator to firm. Nevertheless, Title VII allows attribution of
harassment to firms both when the harasser is the grievant's supervisor
and when he is a non-supervisory peer, though the attribution may be
stricter for supervisors than for peers .2 Title VIl's attribution of
harassment from perpetrator to firm is anomalously broad from the
standpoint of vicarious liability principles.
This anomaly is highlighted by very different jurisprudence found
under § 1983.2" Courts have ruled that peer harassers cannot be held
liable under § 1983 because they do not act "under color of law" when
harassing.2' 4 Courts reason that peer harassers act in pursuit of their own
personal interests, not any state purpose.2 4' For this reason, they cannot
be regarded as wielding state authority, therefore do not act "under
color," and cannot be held liable under § 19 83.*2 Generalized, such
logic could prove far too much, implying that no state employee
misconduct could ever be "under color" since misconduct does not
serve state interests. Though courts have rejected this logic as a general
proposition, they find it persuasive in the harassment context because
the intentional personal purposes behind harassment seem to separate it
sharply from state purposes or interests.
Such logic, barring peer liability under § 1983, could naturally be
applied under Title VII to bar vicarious attribution from harassers to
firms. If harassers do not act "under color" in § 1983 analysis because
they do not serve state purposes or interests, they likewise do not serve
employer purposes or interests. Therefore, vicarious liability under Title
VII seems misplaced. The divergence between § 1983 "color of law"
and Title VII vicarious liability analysis is striking because the inquiry
is so similar. Stressing the intentional personal purposes behind
harassment, as in § 1983 jurisprudence, highlights the strangeness of the
Title VII vicarious liability doctrine holding firms liable for intentional

238. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1997), afjd sub. nom.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998).
239. See Noland v. McAdoo, 39 F.3d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that for a § 1983
claim, defendant must be a supervisor or otherwise exercise state authority over plaintiff); see also
Murphy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 638 F. Supp. 464, 467-68 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that there is
no § 1983 liability among state co-workers because sexual harassment is unrelated to "powers and
duties" of defendants' jobs or to "state authority" conferred on defendants).
240. See Wise v. New York City Police Dep't, 928 F. Supp. 355, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
241. See Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1401 (10th Cir. 1992).
242. See Noland, 39 F.3d at 271 (stating that for a § 1983 claim, defendant must be a
supervisor or otherwise exercise state authority over plaintiff); see also Woodward, 977 F.2d at
1400 (discussing cases that have not found liability under § 1983 against a co-employee for
harassment when the harassment did not involve the use of state authority or position).
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and personal employee misconduct.
There is an irony to be glimpsed here. First, §1983's color of law
doctrine highlights the strangeness of employer liability under Title VII
and points to the harasser himself as the appropriate liability target. But
the "color of law" doctrine then insulates the harasser from liability, at
least under § 1983. Recourse against him lies in the field of common
law intentional tort.
Further anomalies emerge from examining "color of law" analysis
for supervisor harassment liability. Courts have held supervisors liable
for harassment under § 1983 by virtue of two different theories: for
perpetrating harassment themselves, 43 and for failing "under color of
law" to prevent harassment by subordinates.'M The first anomaly is to
regard supervisors who harass to be acting "under color," while peer
harassers are ruled not to be acting "under color." Supervisor harassers,
pursuing intentional and personal purposes, are de-linked from state
interests just as much as peer harassers, and therefore seem to fall
outside "color of law" just as much. The only basis for different
treatment is to imagine that supervisor harassers abuse power over
grievants conferred by the state, while peer harassers do not. That
distinction holds no water in true agency analysis, but posits instead that
the supervisor's "office" goes with him whatever he does on the job.
Such a principle would obviously not apply to murder, theft, or other
forms of turpitudinous misconduct. Why harassment should get unique
treatment is puzzling. Hence, the supervisor/peer distinction for color of
law analysis is at least elusive and perhaps illusive.
There is a second type of "supervisor" liability under § 1983,
referring not to the victim's supervisor but to the harasser's.45
Supervisors may be held liable for failure to prevent harassment by their
subordinates. 6 The difference between a supervisor's failure to forestall
harassment by a subordinate and his harassment of a subordinate has not
been made significant for "color of law" analysis, but it should be. A
supervisor's failure to forestall harassment goes not to his personal
agenda, but to his exercise of state-conferred responsibility over
subordinates. Supervisors should prevent subordinate public employees
from harassing other workers, and anyone else for that matter.
Misfeasance in this supervisory responsibility occurs "under color"

243.
244.
245.
246.

See Wise, 928 F. Supp. at 368.
See id.
See Anderson, supranote 235, at 67.
See id.
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even if acts of harassment themselves because of their intensely
personal motivation do not. Ironically, supervisor liability under § 1983
makes more sense for failure to prevent harassment than for active
harassment.
Supervisor liability under § 1983 for failure to prevent harassment
invites comparison with Title VII employer liability. In this dimension,
supervisors in § 1983 doctrine are more analogous to employers than to
supervisors under Title VII because they can be named as defendants
and because their responsibility, rightly understood, sounds in duty to
prevent. The key question is what standard should define the scope of
duty breached by a failure to prevent. Both Title VII and § 1983
establish duties by some parties to prevent harassment by others and
confront the same issue: how broad that duty to prevent should be. But
they give very different answers.
Defining the scope of any duty to prevent harm inflicted by others
requires attention to at least three general factors: egregiousness of
harms to be prevented, the duty-bearing party's capacity to prevent such
harms, and negative effects of successful or unsuccessful prevention
efforts. Depending on variations in these factors, duties to prevent can
be wisely set according to standards ranging from lax to stringent. Such
varying standards are traditionally differentiated from each other by
virtue of distinct levels of culpability established as prerequisites for
stating claims against duty-burdened parties. The familiar menu of
possible standards for duties to prevent, ranged along a spectrum of
culpability levels, high to low, include: (1) malice or specific intent; (2)
actual knowledge; (3) reckless disregard; (4) gross negligence; (5)
deliberate indifference and similar standards such as negligence,
foreseeability, constructive knowledge, knew or should have; and (6)
strict duty (any occurrence represents breach of duty to prevent). Along
this spectrum, the scope of the duty to prevent moves from narrow to
broad to absolute.
Numerous § 1983 decisions wrestle with the scope of supervisor
liability for workplace harassment. There is clarity at two poles and
fuzziness in between. At one pole, supervisors are liable for harassment
they perpetrate directly upon subordinates, even though such acts
arguably fall outside color of law.' 7 At the other pole, supervisors are
not strictly liable for harassment committed by subordinates. 48 Less
247. See Wise, 928 F. Supp. at 368.
248. See Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1476 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no
respondent superior liability under § 1983). But see Kelsey-Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
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clear is where the line of liability runs over the murky middle ground.
What is the scope of supervisor duty to prevent harassment by
subordinates?
Decisions are scattered across this middle terrain. Some rulings,

strongly pro-defendant, allow supervisor liability only for active
participation or encouragement, very close to direct supervisor
perpetration.249 Other decisions and holdings require actual knowledge
of the harassment2'0 Other decisions, more plaintiff-friendly, allow
supervisor liability based on constructive knowledge."' All these
approaches suggest some affirmative supervisor duty to prevent,

premising liability on culpable failure to prevent. They differ on the
scope of that duty. It is conceivable, however, that a consensus could
emerge. An incipient consensus in the bulk of the cases is toward a

limited affirmative duty to prevent. Such a limited duty could aptly be
captured by a standard of "deliberate indifference. ' ' That murky
standard can perhaps best be understood as the failure to prevent in
circumstances where capacity to prevent is high and its burdensomeness
is low. It lies between ordinary negligence and outright malice: the
indifference must be deliberate, not inadvertent, but the deliberateness
need not equal malice. Whether and how deliberate indifference differs

F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990).
249. See Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that there must be a
causal connection, meaning encouragement, condemnation, acquiescence, or deliberate
indifference between the supervisor and the harassment in order to hold the employer liable);
Cross v. State of Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (l1th Cir. 1995) (finding liability only when the
supervisor personally participates or there is a "causal connection" between the supervisor's
actions and the violation); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring personal
participation of supervisors to impose liability); Farrell v. State of New York, 946 F. Supp. 185,
195 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that personal involvement by supervisor, is defined as: "(1) direct
participation, or (2) failure to remedy the alleged wrong after learning of it, or (3) creation of a
policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or (4) gross negligence in
managing subordinates"); Wise v. New York City Police Dep't, 928 F. Supp. 355, 368 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that supervisors may be held liable "if they are personally involved in actions that
cause the deprivation of constitutional rights"); Redman v. Lima City Seh. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 889
F. Supp. 288, 295 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (requiring actual encouragement or direct participation in the
incident to impose liability on supervisor).
250. See Farris v. Board of County Comm'rs, 924 F. Supp. 1041, 1049 (D. Kan. 1996)
(holding that supervisory liability under § 1983 requires allegations of "personal direction or of
actual knowledge and acquiescence"); Estate of Scott v. DeLeon, 603 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D.
Mich. 1985) (holding that a supervisor who "knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate's
constitutional violations could be sued under section 1983").
251. See Redpath v. City of Overland Park, 857 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (D. Kan. 1994); Carillo
v. Ward, 770 F. Supp. 815, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
252. See Sanchez v. Alvorado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996); Woodward v. City of
Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1992).
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from gross negligence, recklessness, and shock to the conscience is at
best obscure.
Defining the duty to prevent harassment by a deliberate
indifference standard nevertheless seems intuitively fair because it
respects inherent limits on capacities to prevent willful misconduct by
human beings and also because it limits liability pressure which could
compel duty-burdened parties to institutionalize onerous surveillance
and control over subordinates. The deliberate indifference standard also
resonates with § 1983 jurisprudence on other issues. It has at least three
pertinent antecedents.
First, deliberate indifference is the liability standard applied to
government entities for failure to train officials and employees against
constitutional infringements.' 3 Liability based on failure to train implies
or assumes a governmental duty to prevent constitutional violations by
officials/employees. "Deliberate indifference" defines that duty's scope.
Second, deliberate indifference is the liability standard often
applied for individual violators of substantive due process liberty rights
to be free from personal injury.-4 The right to be free from stateimposed sexual harassment is arguably such a due process right, a
theme elaborated above.
Third, deliberate indifference has already been deployed in some
harassment cases on another issue: as a synonym for discriminatory
intent, which must be proved in order to establish deprivations of
constitutional equal protection rights arguably violated by harassment
under color."5
Synthesizing and abstracting from these sources suggests that
deliberate indifference may emerge as the master harassment
jurisprudence under § 1983, defining prevention duties for both
government entities and supervisors. This development is
preconditioned by the proliferation of deliberate indifference standards
already established in § 1983 jurisprudence and also by caution over
imposing broad § 1983 duties to protect citizens from third-party harm.
Deliberate indifference as a standard establishes an affirmative duty to
forestall harassment but carefully limits its scope. Moreover, "deliberate
indifference" is morally evocative in defining prevention failures
egregious enough to warrant actionability.
253. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989).
254. See, e.g., Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 955-56 (lst Cir. 1992).
255. See Murphy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 638 F. Supp. 464, 469-70 (N.D. Il. 1986)
(holding that the discriminatory intent requirement is satisfied where the supervisor was
"deliberately indifferent" to sexual harassment of subordinate).
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In a liberal democracy, the state and its officialdom should not be
deemed comprehensively responsible for citizen well-being, yet should
not be deliberately indifferent to preventable harm. Even in the
workplace, where the state's duty of care could arguably be tightened in
light of notions that employment constitutes a "special relationship" or
is quasi-custodial, a limited duty has much to recommend it. A
heightened duty could saddle officials with distracting burdens to
monitor and regulate complex social interactions in the workplace and
to devise preventive interventions. It is not obvious that harassment
merits such solicitude more than other evils that may befall citizens or
state workers, nor that municipalities and taxpayers should
constitutionally be required to shoulder the costs. Forestalling
harassment, like forestalling malicious misconduct of any sort, is
difficult. There are many other things municipalities need to do.
The possible emergence of deliberate indifference as the duty to
prevent standard under § 1983 is striking because that standard is less
stringent than either strict duty or negligence-the only existing Title
VII standards on vicarious liability for employee harassment. Instead of
viewing Title VII standards in terms of vicarious liability, we can view
them as duty to prevent standards. This makes extra sense when
recalling the strangeness of applying vicarious liability to acts of
harassment sharply removed from any employer purpose or interest.
Though confusingly discussed as vicarious liability, employer liability
under Title VII makes far more sense when understood in terms of a
duty to prevent. Where the harasser is the victim's supervisor, some
courts apply a strict employer duty to prevent while others apply a
negligence standard.26 A negligence standard also operates where the
harasser is the victim's peer."7 The Title VII standards impose a
prevention duty stricter than § 1983's, requiring less culpability to
establish liability.
B. GeneralNormsfor Employer Duty to Prevent
This discrepancy between Title VII and § 1983 standards provokes
reflection on the pros and cons of stringent and lenient duties to prevent.
If containing harassment were the only concern, a stringent duty to
prevent would recommend itself. However, there are serious
256. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1997), affd sub. noran.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998).
257. See id. at 494.
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disadvantages to a stringent duty and its advantages may be less than
they seem. A stringent duty places employers under liability pressure to
regulate, monitor, propagandize, and investigate work forces. These
practices may be onerous to both employers and workers. Furthermore,
there is great doubt whether they successfully curtail harassment,
especially the most egregious harassment." 8 If tightened control over
workforces has slight impact on egregious harassment, its negative
consequences should be weighed heavily in choosing a standard for
duty to prevent. Less stringent may be wiser.
Imposing a prevention duty on employers will not curb harassment
unless employers routinely hit harassers with severe sanctions like
discharge. But it is difficult for employers to gauge misconduct and
discipline it in proper degree. Overly harsh and intrusive antiharassment rules, inquests, and sanctions will produce repressive and
repressed workplaces. On the other hand, insufficiently harsh and
intrusive prevention will fail to curb harassment or protect firms from
liability. Firms can scarcely hope to put a dent in real harassment
without harshness and intrusiveness severe enough to cast a repressive
pall over workplace climates. Moreover, serious problems attend the
harassment investigations employers perform to protect themselves
from liability exposure created by broad duties to prevent.
First, employers may have strategic interests in the outcomes of
such investigations, leading to bias. Deterrence of harassment through
this indirect mechanism-employer liability and employer-sponsored
sanctions-may produce biases of over-inclusiveness or underinclusiveness, excesses of severity or leniency. Employers may sanction
egregious incidents too lightly so as to downplay their seriousness and
perhaps avoid liability, or may sanction petty incidents too heavily so as
to prove anti-harassment zeal, again in order to avoid liability. They
may also sanction egregious incidents lightly when the harasser is high
in value to the firm and sanction petty or unproved incidents heavily
when the real or alleged culprit is low in value. This gamesmanship is
not conducive to optimal deterrence of egregious harassment nor to
proportionality between the harasser's degree of wrongdoing and his
severity of punishment. Rational deterrence is more likely to emerge
from suits filed directly against harassers than from the roundabout and
imprecise operation of employer duties to prevent. The wisdom of
stringent employer duties to prevent is therefore questionable.
258. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassmentas a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment
LiabilityShould Be Curtailed,30 CoNN. L. REV. 375, 407-16 (1998).
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Second, broad liability exposure and the desire to escape it may
drive employers to conduct investigations that violate privacy, defame
reputations, disrupt workplace friendships and comity, and flout due
process norms of notice, relevance, hearsay, privilege, search, and selfincrimination. No law before harassment law ever forced employers to
inquire so routinely into employee misconduct. And there are no legal
rules to govern or control how they do it. The implications of having
employers engage systematically in quasi-legal inquests without legal
constraints deserve far more attention than they have received so far.
Again, this calls into question the wisdom of stringent employer
prevention duties.29
Since the duty to prevent issues differ little between Title VII and §
1983 contexts, a unifying standard would make sense. If so, for reasons
just discussed, the Title VII standard should be relaxed to comport with
§ 1983's "deliberate indifference" threshold. In other words, employers
should not be liable under Title VII without proof of deliberate
indifference to harassment in the workplace. Though this would make
Title VII recovery tougher, it would not cause increased harassment if
the stringent prevention duty does not curb harassment anyway. Under a
less stringent employer duty, more harassment targets would be left
without redress against employers, but victims of egregious harassment
could find redress in suits filed directly against harassers. Such suits, for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and other claims, would yield
stronger, more precise deterrence than Title VII's expansive prevention
duty produces and would ease pressure for intrusive workplace control
and surveillance.2 °
A deliberate indifference approach would aptly define the scope of
employer duty to prevent and could clear the underbrush away from
current Title VII doctrine, with its tangled rules of faux-vicarious
liability and inquiries into adequate preventive steps. Factors currently
treated under these discrete doctrines of attribution and prevention could
be folded into a unified fact-sensitive inquiry into deliberate
indifference. As in § 1983, deliberate indifference would imply some
affirmative duty to prevent, but within tightly circumscribed boundaries,
sensitive to the costs of prevention measures, their limited effectiveness,
and their negative side effects.
A circumscribed duty to prevent, encapsulated in a deliberate
indifference standard, would have the further virtue of roughly matching
259. See id. at 411-16.
260. See id. at 389-93.
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the prevailing doctrine on employer duty to prevent employee
intentional torts. Intentional torts by employees normally lie outside the
scope of employment, and are therefore not subject to vicarious
liability. 6' However, they can yield employer liability non-vicariously,
if the employer breaches a direct duty to prevent them.262 Employers
have such a direct duty under doctrines of negligent hiring, retention,
and supervision.263 These doctrines tell employers they must keep
employees from using their job positions to inflict tortious harm.
This direct employer duty is not strict, or else it would equal
vicarious liability, thereby flouting the rule that employee intentional
torts fall outside the scope of employment. Instead, duty is defined by a
negligence norm, suggested in the doctrinal names themselves:
negligent hiring/retention/supervision. 2 4 This negligence norm imposes
a limited employer duty to prevent employee use of job positions to
inflict intentional harm. 65 The negligence norm is more limited than
strict duty, but may not be limited enough. It may allow creeping duty
expansion.
Negligence norms impose liability based on foreseeability and/or
constructive knowledge.2 Under such norms, firms who know or
should know of an employee's dangerous proclivities are liable when he
inflicts harm. 2 67 This may yield liability broad enough to burden firms
heavily in their employee management practices. Avoiding undue
burdens should be a key factor in setting standards of care. Fortunately,
employer duties under negligent hiring/retention/supervision doctrine
may be narrower in practice than the foreseeability/constructive
knowledge standard suggests. Decisions imposing negligent
hiring/retention/supervision liability typically stress actual employer
knowledge of dangerous employee proclivities. 2 If the liability
standard is closer to actual than constructive knowledge, the duty
imposed is relaxed. This relaxed duty acknowledges employer burdens
in predicting and forestalling employee misconduct.
However, an actual knowledge standard may be too narrow.
Requiring proof of actual knowledge may encourage employers to hide
261. See Rodolfo A. Camacho, How to Avoid Negligent Hiring Litigation, 14 WHITIER L.

REv. 787,792 (1993).
262.
263.
264.
265.

See id. at 793.
See id. at 788-89.
See Smith v. Datacard Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1082 (D. Minn. 1998).
See Mandy v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 940 F. Supp. 1463, 1471 (D. Minn. 1996).

266. See id
267. See id. at 1470 (citing Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983)).
268. See Hager, supra note 258, at 428-29.
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in willful ignorance of employee proclivities. A balanced approach,
weighing employer capacity to foresee and prevent employee torts
against the burdens of doing so, lies between constructive and actual

knowledge. Deliberate indifference falls in that middle zone. Tort
jurisprudence on negligent hiring/retention/supervision seems to
converge around that standard. That is a good thing. An anti-harassment
duty tuned to that standard is also a good thing.
C. MunicipalLiability

Under § 1983, harassment victims may claim liability against the
municipality or other state political subdivision they work for.269 Under
current law, of course, municipalities may also be answerable as

"employers" under Title VII. 270 From the standpoint of liability doctrine,
plaintiffs will generally find it far easier to win under Title VII than
under § 1983. There are, nevertheless, reasons why plaintiffs may wish

to plead § 1983 claims against municipal employers. First, § 1983
claims avoid EEOC administrative process requirements and tight filing

deadlines for Title VII claims.27' Second, § 1983 claims avoid limits on
compensatory and punitive damages imposed under Title VII.2 2 Third,
certain categories of public employees may be excluded from protection
under Title VII.2 "

Title VII liability is easier to establish than § 1983 municipal
liability due to the greater stringency of duty it imposes to forestall
employee misconduct. 74 Under Title VII, employers are held to strict
liability,"' a facsimile of respondeat superior for supervisor harassment
in some courts or else constructive knowledge liability. 276 This is

slightly weaker than respondeat superior for supervisor harassment in
some courts and for peer harassment.2 77 Courts also inquire whether an
269. See Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 76F.3d 1155, 1158 (1lth Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S.
Ct. 2275 (1998).
270, See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
271. See id. §§ 20OOe-5(c), -5(e)(1) (listing administrative process requirements and filing
deadlines).
272. See id § 1981a(b)(3).
273. See Fultz v. Waldron, No. CIV.A.93-891, 1994 WL 146361, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 19,
1994). But see Kostishak v. Mannes, 145 F.3d 1325 (4th Cir. 1998).
274. See Howard v. Town of Jonesville, 935 F. Supp. 855, 860 (W.D. La. 1996).
275. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997), aff'd sub. non.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998).
276. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522, 1529 (M.D. Fla.
1991). "Constructive knowledge is measured by a practical threshold." id. at 1531.
277. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 498.
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employer failed to take effective remedial steps. 8
By contrast, §1983 law explicitly repudiates municipal respondeat
superior liability and municipal liability based on negligence.279
Municipal liability under § 1983 requires-in theory at least-active
infringement of a constitutional right: a custom, policy, or practice
giving rise to the deprivation.2 ° There are said to be three distinct ways
to establish proof of such a custom, policy, or practice. 1 The first, and
rarest, is by proof of an explicit policy.' The second is by an act or
decision by an official with policymaking authority over the matter in
question." The third is by "deliberate indifference" in failure to
forestall a particular infringement, usually couched as failure to train
employees how to avoid it!" The basic drift is to require active
municipal wrongdoing, not merely the passive employer culpability
actionable under Title VII.'
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 6 for example, women
lifeguards harassed by their supervisors brought a medley of claims
against their municipal employer and several of its employees.2'
Plaintiffs sued the municipality only under Title VII, not § 1983, even
though they asserted § 1983 claims against the individual employees.2
There was no point in naming the municipality under § 1983 because
the Title VII claim was easier to prove. Even more telling is the
decision in Jarnan v. City of Northlake.29 There, a city's alleged
five-month delay before responding to an employee's harassment
complaint was ruled sufficient to establish Title VII liability for failure
to take prompt remedial steps, 2' but insufficient in itself to establish a
municipal custom or policy of non-responsiveness to harassment.29'
Even though Jarman suggests that long delay may not by itself
suffice to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a crucial
278. See JacksonvilleShipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1531.
279. See Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 818 (10th Cir. 1989).
280. See Howard, 935 F. Supp. at 860.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id.; see also Starrett, 876 F.2d at 818 (requiring official to be responsible for
establishing final government policy before municipality can be held liable).
284. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1989).
285. See id. at 385.
286. 76 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
287. See Faragher,76 F.3d at 1158.
288. See id.
289. 950 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
290. See Jarnan,950 F. Supp. at 1379.
291. See id. at 1382.
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pro-defendant fact was that remedial steps were eventually taken."
Other decisions make clear that failure to take remedial steps can be
construed as constituting policy so as to establish § 1983 municipal
liability. 293 This jurisprudence co-exists uneasily with doctrine that
municipal liability turns on active perpetration. This passive/active
tension invites courts to assess actionability based on fact-intensive
inquiries into severity and pervasiveness of harassment, degrees of
municipal knowledge, and existence of anti-harassment policies.294 This,
of course, sounds much like Title VII harassment jurisprudence.
Municipalities with actual knowledge of harassment episodes clearly
stand under a liability cloud if they fail to take ameliorative steps. 291
However, § 1983 and Title VII are separated, at minimum, by the
difference between deliberate indifference and constructive
knowledge.296
D. MunicipalDeliberateIndifference
I argue above that municipalities commit a due process personhood
violation when they manifest deliberate indifference toward employee
harassment. Of course, the actual law, § 1983 law, has treated
harassment as a discrimination offense. 29' Under that rubric, a
jurisprudence of municipal harassment liability has begun to emerge. I
wish to examine that jurisprudence and offer normative comments on it.
For these purposes, the difference between the personhood and
discrimination models is not terribly important. I begin with a quick
summary of municipal liability issues likely to arise on a recurring
basis, and how I think those issues should be handled. I then explore
some of them in more detail.
At minimum, municipalities must ensure that harassment can
safely be reported to disinterested supervisors or authorities and that
such parties will take non-burdensome steps to stop it. In a sense, that is
all there is to say about municipal duty. To the extent that municipalities
fail to provide for safe and effective reporting and fail to take nonburdensome steps to stop harassment, they convict themselves of
292.

See id.

293. See Farris v. Board of County Cornn'rs, 924 F. Supp. 1041, 1049 (D. Kan. 1996);
Houck v. City of Prairie Village, 912 F. Supp. 1438, 1442 (D. Kan. 1996).
294. See Farris,924 F. Supp. at 1048-49.
295. See Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992).
296. See id.; Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1529.
297. See Farris,924 F. Supp. at 1048; Jarman, 950 F. Supp. at 1380.
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deliberate indifference. Three subsidiary questions present themselves,
however. One, should anti-harassment policies preclude municipal
liability? Two, should municipalities be liable for failure to train
workforces against harassment? My answer to both these questions is
no. Three, what analysis should be used for determining whether
unconstitutional acts by officials constitute official policymaking?
E.Anti-HarassmentPolicies
It would be unfortunate for courts to fall for the foolish proposition
that municipalities can meet their anti-harassment obligations simply by
promulgating policies. At least one court has made that mistake. In
Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority,298 a woman subjected to
repeated sexual advances by her supervisor brought several claims,
including a § 1983 claim against her municipal employer.2 " The court
curtly dismissed that claim, ruling that the harassment could not be
attributed to the municipal agency because "its stated policies are
explicitly nondiscriminatory." ' Remarkably enough, the court saw no
need to analyze those policies or even describe them.3"' Neither did it
bother to ask whether those policies were earnestly or effectively
0
implemented."
In the court's mind, the sheer existence of stated
anti-harassment policies nullified per se any allegation that harassment
could be municipal "policy." The defect in this reasoning is glaring.
It is well-established in § 1983 jurisprudence that courts should
inquire into municipal "custom" and "practice," not just policy. 3 One
reason for this is simply that an organization's real policies may depart
from its stated policies. A per se defense based on stated
anti-harassment policies encourages municipalities to promulgate such
policies for the record in order to defeat liability, but also encourages
lax execution since mere promulgation provides full liability protection.
A per se defense may reward deliberate indifference, not punish it. The
law should instead seek to encourage active concern. On the other hand,
absence of a stated anti-harassment policy should not be deemed
deliberate indifference per se. Instead, stress should be laid on specific
organizational shortcomings: reporting obstructions, fear of retaliatory
298. 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
299. See Carrero,890 F.2d at 574.
300. Id. at 577.

301. See id. at 570.
302. See id.
303. See Farris,924 F. Supp. at 1048.
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discharge, and failures to discipline misconduct.
F. Failureto Train
Failure to train a workforce in avoiding unconstitutional acts has
long been recognized as a ground for municipal liability under § 1983. 04
At least one ruling has approved such a theory with respect to
harassment.30 s However, liability for training failure is not a good idea
with harassment. The paradigm for proper application of training failure
liability is with police schooling on constitutional law and proper
practices for searches, arrests, force, and the like. Training deals with
essentials of proper job execution, deficiencies of which tend to cause
constitutional infringements. Anti-harassment training has scant
similarity to this because anti-harassment training has little or nothing to
do with reducing harassment. Harassment stems not from poor job
execution but from the malicious or callous proclivities of harassers. It
is caused by harasser turpitude, not by failure to train. Failure to train
claims with respect to harassment should be dismissed because it is
unreasonable to conclude that deficient training causes harassment. No
one can know what "training" might prevent deliberate misconduct.
An anti-harassment training duty would snarl municipalities with a
vague and undefined task unrelated to delivery of good government and
services. There would be other negative effects as well. First, it would
entrench the notion that training can successfully suppress harassment,
even though anti-harassment training probably achieves little except
creating jobs for dubious consultants? ° Second, it would place
municipalities under enormous pressure to sponsor training (at taxpayer
expense) for their patronized workforces. Third, it would bring about
the equivalent of respondeat superior liability, because any harassment
committed by employees could produce liability for a municipality that
had failed to train. Preclusion of respondeat superior liability is a
bedrock of § 1983 jurisprudence (for better or worse), but failure to
train liability would erode that rock wherever harassment training was
absent. Fourth, it would suck major resources, experts and all, into
litigating the adequacy of any training that did get offered. This huge
inquiry would need to evade and deny the acid question lodged in its
304. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
305. See Barcume v. City of Flint, 819 F. Supp. 631,656 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
306. See Judith I. Avner, Sexual Harassment:Building a Consensusfor Change, 3-SPG KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 74 (1994). There are assertions in the literature that anti-harassment training
is effective, but such assertions lack empirical substantiation. See id.
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heart: whether there is or could be training adequate to suppress
harassment.
If skepticism over anti-harassment training is warranted under §
1983, it is warranted under Title VII as well. Title VII doctrine-with
its faux-vicarious liability and defenses based on adequate remedial
steps-will in coming years build more and more pressure to litigate the
existence and adequacy of anti-harassment training. Sensitivity training
firms already thrive in the market for anti-harassment programming
created by Title VII liability?' 7 Among the marvels enterprise has
produced for this market-driven and corporate-sponsored moral
education are videos, CD-Rom exercises, and "role-playing" sessions.0 8
I have three comments on all this: (1) it's insipid; (2) it's demeaning;
and (3) it's futile. Aside from horse sense about human nature, there is
at least some empirical evidence that anti-harassment training does not
help much."° Such training has been common in federal workplaces for
a least a decade, yet harassment rates appear to be unchanged and no
correlation is discernible showing reduced harassment in bureaus where
training has occurred. 0 If such training is fruitless, costly, and even
harmful, Title VII harassment doctrine needs serious reconsideration.
G. FinalPolicymakingAuthority
Courts have grappled with questions of whether, when, and how
unconstitutional acts of single officials establish municipal policy for
purposes of assessing § 1983 liability. It is hard to establish municipal
liability if one can never impute municipal policy from the acts and
decisions of officials. On the other hand, over-liberal imputation of
policy from acts by officials verges on respondeat superior liability,
impermissible under § 1983. The question-begging test, often invoked
for assessing when an official's acts constitute policy, is whether he has
exercised the municipality's "final policymaking authority" over the
matter. This test is silly putty in the hands of courts deciding whether
307.
BOSTON
308.
309.

See
Bus.
See
See

Julie Carrick Dalton, Video Company Benefitsfrom State Sexual HarassmentLaws,
J., Nov. 1, 1996, at 12.
id.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLAcE: TRENDS, PROGRESS,
CONTINUING CHALLENGES, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD viii, 43 (1995); SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF

THE UNITED STATES BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 31 (1988) [hereinafter
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT].

310. See SEXUAL HARASSMENT INTHE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 309.
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municipalities should stand liable for particular bad acts by officials.
Several § 1983 decisions have struggled with this issue in the
specific context of harassment. Their reasoning falls short, but this is
partly because the issue and test are inherently ambiguous. In Howard v.
Town of Jonesville,3 ' harassment came at the hands of the town mayor.
Since the mayor is a town's "ultimate policymaker,"31 2 the court reasons
quite simply that his acts of harassment while mayor constitute
municipal policy. 313 However, this implies that any wrong he might
commit (in the workplace at least) represents policy. The line separating
this from respondeat superior is thin indeed. A better analysis might be
as follows: "policymaking" occurs only when an official mobilizes the
peculiar powers of his specific office in executing some action. Contrast
a mayor who will not appoint black department chiefs with one who
will not hire blacks for his personal staff. The former is municipal
policymaking, but the latter arguably not because it does not wield
distinctive mayoral prerogatives. Though the mayor should be liable
personally for all his racism under color of law, including all hiring
decisions, his personal staffing decisions do not in themselves constitute
municipal hiring policy. Similarly, it is also not municipal policymaking
when a mayor harasses, using no peculiar mayoral power but only the
general power of any supervisor over his staff.
Under Howard's reasoning, Clinton's alleged harassment of Jones
would constitute Arkansas state policy, by virtue of Clinton's status as
governor. No claim on this ground can be recognized because states are
immunized from § 1983 suits. Still, it is interesting to ponder what the
test for Clinton as a "state policymaker" might properly be, if Arkansas
did not have immunity. If his misdeeds with employees do not
inherently constitute "official policymaking," what about his use of
state employees or other state resources in committing them? I suggest
above that such use, if not merely incidental, would bring his conduct
under "color of law." Should it also be deemed "official policymaking"?
Imputing harassment as municipal policy may ironically make
more sense for lower-level supervisors than for high-ranking officers. If
no policy has been set above, a supervisor's authority over a particular
staff may be a key aspect of his office. If so, discrimination or
harassment by supervisors becomes policymaking for that office.

311. 935 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. La. 1996).
312. Howard, 935 F. Supp. at 860.
313. See id.
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In Williams v. District of Columbia 14 and Murphy v. Chicago
Transit Authority,"5 courts made imputations of municipal policy from
supervisor acts of harassment. Neither ruling offers very painstaking
analysis. Williams features one boilerplate paragraph of imputation
analysis, invoking doctrines such as: "'plausible nexus' between the
challenged conduct and the authority conferred"; whether a supervisor
had "final policymaking authority" under D.C. law; and whether the
harasser's actions stemmed from "the scope and nature of the authority
that the District has vested in her.' 31 6 Without further ado, the court
quickly validates the plaintiff's claim for municipal imputation. Though
the supervisor's policymaking authority is conventionally
treated as an
17
issue of law, Williams treats it as a triable issue of fact
By contrast with Williams, Murphy makes little of doctrinal
formulas, dwelling instead on logical and factual analysis. The
reasoning is unconvincing, combining logical sleight-of-hand with a
dubious factual inference. The court starts by noting that claims in the
case have been validly stated against individual supervisors for
deliberately indifferent failure to stop harassment by the plaintiffs
peers." 8 Strangely, the court suggests that such indifference constitutes
official policymaking because the supervisors were deliberately
indifferent as policymakers to their own deliberate indifference as
violators, commenting: "Precisely because the underlying constitutional
violations here are based on the deliberate indifference of the
supervisors, it follows that the supervisors were deliberately indifferent
to their own constitutional violations."3"9 This reasoning turns circles
because the point is to inquire whether the supervisors had their
policymaking hats on when manifesting deliberate indifference in the
form of failure to prevent. The court's reasoning would turn all
supervisory indifference into municipal policymaking, in effect
constructing an enclave of impermissible respondeat superior.
The court seems to break out of this weird logic by stressing that
the supervisory indifference was not "a single, isolated constitutional
violation," but was "sustained continually over a five-month period."3 °
But how does this prove policymaking? If supervisory indifference
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

916 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
638 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. 1. 1986).
Williams, 916 F. Supp. at 6-7.
See id. at 7.
See Murphy, 638 F. Supp. at 469-70.
Id. at471.
Id.
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cannot long persist without becoming policy, duration itself constitutes
policymaking.
This shorts any focus on the nature of the supervisory office or the
supervisor's relationship to perpetrators and victim. It also shorts any
focus on efforts made or not made on high to contain harassment
generally or this harassment in particular. Of course, duration may help
prove that supervisory indifference amounted to municipal policy, or
alternatively, that the municipality itself manifested deliberate
indifference. Nevertheless, the court's per se approach with duration
treads on the line forbidding respondeat superior. It implies that
municipal liability applies whenever supervisory indifference persists
over time. Nevertheless, supervisory indifference would rarely count as
deliberate unless it did persist over time. Therefore, the same fact that
establishes individual supervisory liability establishes municipal
liability. Any difference between that and respondeat superior is purely
semantic. To be sure, the wisdom of § 1983's ban on respondeat
superior is questionable and the theoretical distinction between
respondeat superior and agency is often hazy anyway. However, if that
ban and that distinction are to be defended, analysis must be more
careful than that in Murphy.
Sound outcomes and clarity might both be served by completely
avoiding official policymaker liability for harassment cases. It creates
more confusion than it is worth. Official policymaker cases on
harassment can arise in two basic types: (1) where the "acts" of the
supposed policymaker are ones of harassment; and (2) where those
"acts" take the form of deliberate indifference toward harassment by
subordinates. With either type, findings involve confusions even beyond
those normal to the "official policymaker" area.
For the first type, one may ask how personally-motivated affronts
to personhood could ever be sensibly called official policy. The
strangeness of this redoubles the strangeness of deeming harassment to
fall under "color of law" in the first place, except here the outcome is
municipal liability, not just personal liability. Because of harassment's
deeply personal aspect, the strangeness of treating it as a manifestation
of municipal agency is higher than for normal situations of official
policymaker analysis. Consequently, it is difficult to see treating acts of
harassment as official policymaking as other than sheer exercise of
respondent superior. That itself runs afoul of normal "scope of the
employment" analysis, of course. Moreover, it runs afoul of the ban on
respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Therefore, this whole
approach has little to recommend it.
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Equally serious problems beset the second type of official
policymaker cases, where the underlying "acts" consist of deliberate
indifference toward subordinate harassment. Under what logic could
such "acts" of deliberate indifference be deemed acts of "official
policymaking"? It is almost impossible to make this inquiry intelligible
without flopping over into respondeat superior logic or else inquiry into
direct deliberate indifference by the municipality itself toward the
subordinate's harassment, in which case the "official policymaker"
inquiry winds up superfluous and confusing. Respondeat superior is out
of bounds and direct deliberate indifference by the municipality toward
employee harassment is on the table anyway. The whole "official
policymaker" game is not worth the candle.
What is left of municipal liability? If my arguments are sound,
approaches based on failure to train and official policymaker should
both be rejected for harassment cases. Liability based on explicit policy
of harassment can be expected to be rare or nonexistent. What's left is
simply liability based on municipal deliberate indifference to
harassment. Though municipal deliberate indifference may defy precise
specification, the purpose and logic of the inquiry are close and unified.
This is far from the case with failure to train and official policymaking
analysis. Decisions emerging from these lines of analysis are likely to
be idiosyncratic and less sound and comprehensible than those produced
by straightforward inquiry into municipal deliberate indifference.
H. Quid Pro Quo and HostileEnvironment
The distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment
harassment carries ambiguous implications for municipal policy
analysis. At first glance, it would seem easier to impute municipal
policy from quid pro quo than from hostile environment harassment.
Because quid pro quo entails manipulation of tangible job status and
benefits, it touches on the formal contractual relationship between a
municipality and the victim employee. In manipulating terms of that
relationship, the harasser impersonates agency power. Though the
harasser wields agency power only as an impostor, the risk of abuse of
position should lie with the party granting it, not with victims.
Therefore, municipalities should be liable for quid pro quo harassment.
The matter is arguably quite different with hostile environment. By
definition, hostile environment harassment involves no manipulation of
formal job status or prerogatives. In itself, it does not implicate
municipal policy. Therefore, municipal liability should not lie for
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"
supervisor hostile environment harassment alone.32
'
This basic line of thought seems to get played out in Starrett v.
Wadley.3z In that case, the harasser fired his subordinate for refusing
sexual advances and for consulting an attorney regarding the
harassment. 32 He faced personal § 1983 claims for the discharge and for
prior intrusive advances. 32' The court addressed whether those claims
laid any foundation for claims against the municipality. 325 It treated the
dismissal as municipal policy because the perpetrator "had final
authority to set employment policy as to the hiring and firing of his
staff.''31 On the other hand, hostile environment harassment that
occurred prior to discharge was deemed personal, not official, because it
did not involve tangible employment
perquisites like "job title or
3 27
levels.
"salary
and
description"
Starrett differs sharply from Title VII doctrine on imputing
supervisor harassment to firms.3 ' Under Title VII, both quid pro quo
and hostile environment harassment may be imputed from supervisors
to firms. 329 However, if the line Starrettdraws between quid pro quo and
hostile environment makes sense for § 1983, it makes equal sense under
Title VII.330 If so, Title VII hostile environment liability should be
narrowed.
Under § 1983, the relationship between quid pro quo and hostile
environment can get even more perplexing. An inversion can emerge in
which organizational liability is easier to establish for hostile
environment than for quid pro quo because of the rule against
respondeat superior. Imputing quid pro quo harassment to a
municipality could be viewed as impermissible respondeat superior.
Poulsen v. City of North Tonawanda33' holds exactly that.
While rejecting the municipal quid pro quo claim, Poulsen allows a
hostile environment claim against the city, based on failure to

321. See, e.g., Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997), aff'd sub. nor,
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998) (dealing with the issue of whether
employer liability should be tighter for quid pro quo than for hostile environment harassment).
322. 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989).
323. See Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.
324. See id at 812-13.
325. See id. at 818.
326. Id.

327. Id. at 820.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See Starrett, 876 F.2d at 808.
See, e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 1996).
See Starrett, 876 F.2d at 808.
811 F. Supp. 884 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
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investigate and remedy repeated harassment.332 Therefore, contrary to
conventional Title VII assumptions, Poulsen represents harassment
liability attributed more tightly for hostile environment than for quid pro
quo.33 This can happen whenever the person charged with preventing
hostile environment harassment is deemed a policymaker, but the quid
pro quo harasser is not. Though the outcome seems strange under Title
VII conventions, perhaps those conventions deserve more searching
scrutiny.
The conflict between Starrettand Poulsen is total. Courts therefore
seem to have three basic options: (1) Starrett's position that quid pro
quo harassment counts as municipal policy;3 4 (2) Poulsen's position
that imputing quid pro quo, without more, to a municipality is
impermissible respondeat superior; 335 and (3) a middle position that
counts quid pro quo as policy depending on whether the harasser holds
final policymaking authority. 336 No decision that I know of has explicitly
adopted position (3). Application of that approach would return courts
to the same strange situations explored above concerning final
policymaking authority.
IV. LEGAL LIMITs ON ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICIES

A. FirstAmendment Concerns
Free expression concerns get triggered by harassment law because
harassment involves speech. As commentators have observed, Title VII
harassment doctrine and employer steps to avoid lawsuits may yield
repression of workplace speech and expression.337 Whether this puts
Title VII afoul of constitutional speech protections is an important
question. The constitutional issues grow even more tangled when §
1983 is factored in.
Though the Title VII/First Amendment conundrum has received
almost no sustained attention in the courts, the academic debate has
332. See Poulsen, 811 F. Supp. at 899-900.
333. See itL
334. See Starrett,876 F.2d at 820.

335. See Poulsen,811 F. Supp. at 896-97.
336. See Starrett,876 F.2d at 820.
337. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:Hostile Environment Harassmentand
the FirstAmendment, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 481, 483 (1991); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions
Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the FirstAmendment: No Collision in Sight,

47 RuTGERS L. REV. 461,463-65 (1995).
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been lively.338 That debate has focused mainly on private employers
under Title VII. However, municipalities may also be sued for
harassment under Title VII, not to mention § 1983.2"9 Moreover, public
sector supervisors are personally suable under § 19 8 3 ."" The tension
between anti-harassment norms and free speech norms is actually more
direct in the public sector than in the private sector because public
parties, directly bound by the Constitution, may be liable under § 1983
for suppression of free expression rights. Private employers, by contrast,
bear no constitutional duties, 4' and therefore, cannot be sued for speech
infringements because they are not state actors, at least at first glance.
The same goes for private sector supervisors who suppress expression in
the name of enforcing employer anti-harassment policies. This
public/private contrast vanishes if private parties can be regarded as
state actors with duties to observe constitutional norms like free speech.
I will briefly explore below whether Title VII harassment law could
convert private parties into state actors by compelling or encouraging
them to stifle protected speech.
If private employers bear no constitutional duty to protect free
expression, they are free to protect themselves from harassment liability
through policies regulating workplace speech 2 Such policies may be as
drastic as they wish. Though the spectre of speech-repressive
workplaces may impel some to reconsider the wisdom of Title VII
anti-harassment law in its current contours, private employers may have
no constitutional duty to minimize speech-restricting regulation. The
matter is otherwise with public employers. If they regulate workplace
expression beyond constitutional limits, whatever those are, they could
easily face § 1983 lawsuits for offending employee First Amendment
rights. 3 In the public workplace, anti-harassment rights and free
expression rights confront each other directly on the field of
constitutional doctrine.
Two important rulings, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.?

338. See id.
339. See Starrett, 876 F.2d at 814.
340. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,71 (1989).
341. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (imiting it's holding to those acting under color of state
law); Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359,365 (5th Cir. 1997).
342. See Harrington,118 F.3d at 365.
343. See McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1997); Tucker v. State of California
Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1996); Bemheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir.

1996).
344. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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and Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Department,345 help
dramatize the issues. In Jacksonville Shipyards, a workplace rife with
obscene vocabulary, offensive sexual advances, misogynist remarks,
pornography, and vulgar sexual humor was judged a hostile
environment for women, violating Title VII*4 6 As relief, the trial court
entered a sweeping injunction requiring the company to enact rules and
discipline against a variety of practices, including pornography display
and sexually oriented humor. 47 The breadth of that relief sets free
expression nerves on edge. The fear is that repressive censorship will
pervade the American workplace, by force of injunctions or pro-active
steps employers take to forestall harassment liability.
In this context, it is possible that public sector constitutional law
may teach by example how free expression and anti-harassment rights
should be balanced in the workplace. In Johnson, the plaintiff sued his
municipal employer for banning his practice of perusing nudie
magazines at work."' The ban sought to eliminate workplace features
that might create a hostile environment for women, and quite likely was
motivated by a desire to avoid Title VII liability. 349 Nevertheless, the
court struck down the nudie mag ban as unconstitutional, ruling that the
municipality infringed plaintiff' s First Amendment rights by censoring
his reading material.35
It is not easy to reconcile Johnson with Jacksonville Shipyards.
The obvious differences are that Jacksonville Shipyards involved a
private employer that was actually sued for harassment,35"' while
Johnson involved a public employer moving proactively against
harassment or against harassment liability at least.1 2 This difference
prevents direct confrontation between the two rulings on First
Amendment terrain, at least for now. But the conflict in values they
embody cannot be ignored and could easily provoke a pitched
engagement under the ambit of § 1983. For drama's sake, one can
imagine crosscutting § 1983 suits within a single public workplace that
bans pornography viewing and display and threatens discipline for
infractions. One suit complains that the ban itself violates free

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

865 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Cal. 1994).
See Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1529.
See id. at 1541.
See Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1434.
See id. at 1434-35.
See id. at 1442.
See Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1490-91.
See Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1433.
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expression rights.353 The other complains that lax enforcement of the ban
creates a hostile environment."' (A Title VII hostile environment claim
could play the same role.) Should the municipality tighten its anti-porn
rules or rescind them?
In the end, the most natural way to reconcile free expression
concerns with anti-harassment concerns is some sort of "directed act" or
"intentionally offensive" requirement for defining speech as
harassment.355 Under this approach, evidence of harassment could not be
found in an act of expression unless it was "directed at" particular
people, intending offense to them. Municipalities and supervisors could
not be liable for harassment unless they culpably failed to curtail
"directed" harassment. On the other hand, they could not be liable under
the First Amendment if they suppressed or regulated only "directed"
harassment.
Free expression and anti-harassment zealots may both object to this
middle approach. Free expression zealots may insist that the First
Amendment protects even deeply wounding speech. Anti-harassment
zealots may insist that protection from harassment justifies broad
censorship of low-value speech. Alongside these polarized objections is
another difficulty: the meaning of "directed" or "intentionally
offensive" harassment is open to different interpretations, which could
set very different balances between anti-harassment and free expression
protections. A better approach is hard to discern, however. If both antiharassment and free expression rights have constitutional status,
defining harassment as targeted intentional offense seems optimal, if not
fully satisfying. It curtails the most egregious harassment, while
protecting from censorship all but the lowest-value expression.
Pressure from First Amendment plaintiffs could serve to prevent
public employers from over-regulating workplace expression in the
name of curtailing harassment. Equivalent pressure may not ever
emerge in the private sector. The result could be that expression would
wind up much less protected for private sector than for public
employees. Private sector workers might seem "compensated" for this
by greater protection from harassment than their public sector
counterparts receive. But this is doubtful. There is no proportional
relation between broad sweep of an employer's anti-harassment rules

353. See id.
354. See JacksonvilleShipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1510.
355. See Brief of Arnicus Curiae Feminists for Free Expression in Support of Petitioner at 6,
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (No. 92-1168).
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and successfully reduced harassment. On the contrary, there are
diminishing returns. As expression constraints reach beyond targeted
offensiveness to milder, less direct harassment, the harm forestalled
incrementally shrinks. Meanwhile, the potential value of the suppressed
speech rises as the scope of suppression broadens from egregious direct
harassment outward. In other words, as speech restraints grow broader,
the amount of harassment they prevent shrinks, and the value of the
additional speech they suppress rises. Though offsetting constitutional
pressures from free speech plaintiffs could lead to a wise balancing of
anti-harassment and free speech norms in the public -workplace, free
speech in private workplaces may be left undefended.
This is by no means inevitable. First, if harassment is redefined for
the public sector as targeted offensiveness-under First Amendment
pressure perhaps-this redefinition could cross to the private sector
even if no direct First Amendment pressure registers there. To protect
First Amendment concerns in the public sector, municipalities would
need protection not just from § 1983 suits but also from Title VII suits.
Therefore, successful First Amendment suits could produce statutory or
case law narrowing Title VII's definition of harassment for public
workplaces. But if the Title VII harassment definition is narrowed for
the public sector, it would almost surely get narrowed for the private
sector as well to maintain uniformity in Title VII law. Therefore, the
First Amendment would project its shadow into the private sector,
though unable to enter bodily.
A more complex scenario is that the First Amendment could come
to play an active part in private sector harassment litigation. This could
happen if employers set the First Amendment up as a defense in
harassment suits against them. The argument would be that compliance
with Title VII harassment law requires of them an unconstitutional
stiffing of expression. Though it might seem there is no state action
where expression is stifled by employers seeking to avoid a purely
private lawsuit, cases like Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,356 New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 7 and Shelley v. Kraeme 5 s give defendants
356. 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (holding that the plaintiffs use of state courts to secure tort
judgments against defendant would involve the state in punishing defendant's exercise of First
Amendment freedoms to discuss public figure and would therefore violate Constitution).
357. 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (holding that the plaintiffs use of state courts to secure tort
judgments against defendant would involve state in punishing defendant's exercise of First
Amendment freedoms to discuss public figure and would therefore violate Constitution).
358. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that the plaintiff's use of state court to enforce racially
restrictive neighborhood housing sale covenant would involve state violating defendant's
Constitutional equal protection rights).
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plenty of ammunition to resist the "no state action" argument. More
daunting to defendants might be the need to assert a direct employer
interest in perpetrating offensive expression as grounds for their First
Amendment defense. This is risky as a litigation strategy, at odds with
the employer's more natural impulse to distance itself from any
relationship to and responsibility for the tainted expression. This
strategic awkwardness may explain why employers have not already
mounted First Amendment defenses to Title VII harassment suits.
Perhaps an employer could invoke the First Amendment without
invoking a direct interest in protecting offensive utterances. A law
encouraging one private party to stifle the speech of another may violate
the First Amendment in itself. Employers may be entitled to invoke the
First Amendment defense simply because enforcement of Title VII may
infringe employee First Amendment interests. So employers could raise
a First Amendment defense to a Title VII suit and vindicate employee
free speech interests by proxy. The intrigue of this is only heightened by
the fact that employers may freely stifle workplace speech on their own
initiative without the faintest concern for the First Amendment.
There is an even stranger scenario waiting in the wings. A private
employee-discharged, disciplined, or restricted in speech under an
anti-harassment policy-might bring a § 1983 suit against his private
employer for stifling his First Amendment rights. To gain First
Amendment protection, the employee might have to show that the
stifled speech went to "public concern," not just "personal interest." ' 9
This threshold might be hard to meet for standard-issue harassment. The
reasoning in Johnson, finding "public concern" in reading nudie mags,
is not without its difficulties.3 6' Moreover, such a suit could fly only if
the private employer can be deemed a state actor in stifling speech. But
this is by no means out of the question. Under current doctrine, private
parties who infringe constitutional interests can be deemed state actors
if state law compels or encourages them to effect the deprivation in
question. 6' Title VII arguably compels and encourages private
employers to stifle workplace speech unconstitutionally. If so, private
employers could find themselves targeted by § 1983 suits seeking to
vindicate speech rights. This could place private employers in the same
squeeze between anti-harassment and free speech norms already felt by
359. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 139 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of
Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
360. See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1435-36 (D. Cal.

1994).
361.

See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1981).
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public employers and supervisors.
B. Due Processfor the Accused?
Public employees dismissed as alleged harassers may assert claims
for infringements of constitutional fights other than First Amendment
rights, namely procedural due process fights to notice and hearing.
Those fights provide partial protection against false accusation or undue
discipline. They can be contrasted with First Amendment rights, which
vindicate a privilege to engage in offensive speech. Like free speech
rights, notice and hearing rights do not exist for private sector
employees unless private employers can be characterized as state actors
under compulsion or encouragement from Title VII law when
discharging alleged harassers.362
Unjust dismissal of alleged harassers may violate a liberty interest
in good reputation or a property interest in job tenure' 63 Such interest
may not easily sound in substantive due process. Defaming someone's
reputation invades a substantive right only if it amounts to deliberate
indifference or shock to the conscience. Dismissing someone for being
an accussed harasser does not invade a substantive right to job tenure.
Job tenure is at most a property right conferred by the state.364 It is not a
fundamental constitutional privilege? 6'
Public employee anti-discharge rights may more easily sound in
procedural due process rights to notice and fair hearing, not as
substantive rights.3 66 Employees wrongfully dismissed from tenured jobs
may conceivably bring procedural due process claims for inadequate
notice or hearing, even if they cannot sustain a substantive due process
claim. In theory, this leaves wrongfully discharged employees in the
odd posture of having rights to protest faulty procedures in the
discharge decision but not to protest substantive error in the decision
itself. The court scrutinizes process, not outcome.3 67 In practice,
however, the procedural protection may be as valuable as a substantive
362. See Catanzano v. Wing, 103 F.3d 223,226 (2d Cir. 1996).
363. See Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491, 494 (6th Cir. 1990); Black v. City
of Auburn, 857 F. Supp. 1540, 1546 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Huff v. County of Butler, 524 F. Supp.
751,753 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
364. See Huff, 524 F. Supp. at 753.
365. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Black, 857 F.
Supp. at 1545.
366. See Nelson v. City of McGehee, 876 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1989); Black, 857 F. Supp. at
1546; Huff, 524 F. Supp. at 753.
367. See Huff, 524 F. Supp. at755.
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one. First, damages from a procedural deficiency may be measured by
the value of substantive deprivations resulting from it. Relief may
include reinstatement and cash.3 Second, such relief should provide
public employers and supervisors incentives to make notice and hearing
procedures meaningful and fair because the risks of a wrongful
discharge would then have to be weighed against the risks of liability
for inaction against harassment. If a plaintiff can prove a defendant was
predisposed to discharge him in order to avoid harassment liability, that
bias might violate his due process right to an impartial hearing. 6 9
But notice and hearing rights may often be unavailable. They apply
only if the grievant has been defamed or deprived of state-conferred job
tenure. 7 Many grievants will have been neither defamed nor deprived
of tenure. There is no defamation if the reason for discharge is kept
secret or if publication of the reason is protected within a privilege to
investigate harassment charges. 371 And a grievant loses no property
interest
if discharged from a position not accorded tenure under state
72
law.

3

State officials may be protected from wrongful dismissal suits by
qualified immunity and municipalities cannot be held liable unless the
wrongful dismissal represents municipal custom, policy or practice.
To overcome qualified immunity, plaintiffs need to prove that the
dismissal violated a "clearly established" constitutional right as
understood by a reasonable person. 374 Despite limitations, the possibility
of suits by at least some wrongfully discharged harassers may impel
public employers and supervisors toward providing regular notice and
hearing and this may confer some protection against wrongful
dismissal. Limited as they are, these protections for accused harassers in
public sector workplaces highlight the absence of protections in the
private sector. Accused harassers in the private sector have no right of
fair process against employers who discharge them. At best, some might
be covered by contractual rights against discharge without good cause.
368. See, e.g., Hill v. City of Pontotoc, 993 F.2d 422, 423-24, 427 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming
award of $30,000 compensatory damages and $103,704 front pay to firefighter discharged without
proper due process, based on finding that if due process had been given, plaintiff would not have
been fired).
369. See Black, 857 F. Supp. at 1547.
370. See Huff, 524 F. Supp. at 753.
371. See Black, 857 F. Supp. 1547-48.
372. See Huff, 524 F. Supp. at 753.
373. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (in order to sue a municipality under § 1983
must prove municipal policy).
374. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, { }(1982).
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Anti-harassment obligations give both private and public
employers one more reason to resist conferring job tenure on
employees, because tenure thwarts efforts to cleanse the workplace of
accused harassers.
V. CONCLUSION
I have tried here to give a picture of what § 1983 jurisprudence has
said or might have to say about issues of harassment. I have stressed the
following themes: (1) the conventional law of harassment as
discrimination is beset with problems, weaknesses, and ambiguities; (2)
there is much to be said for conceptualizing harassment as intentional
assault upon personhood or, in constitutional terms, deprivation of
substantive due process; (3) harassment liability of organizational
entities can wisely and coherently be conceptualized in terms of a
circumscribed duty to prevent, articulated under a deliberate
indifference standard; and (4) constitutional law under the First
Amendment and procedural due process could play a role in checking
harassment law's pressures toward over-regulating work places and
over-disciplining accused harassers.
Constitutional tort jurisprudence has much of interest to say on
harassment. I hope I have conveyed that.
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